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I. Introduction
The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our
society. That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid
the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under
stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits
more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.'
In the landmark case of Schmerber v. California,2 the United States
Supreme Court held that the Government conducts a Fourth Amendment
search when it compels the extraction and testing of a person's blood.3
Generally, for such a search to be constitutionally permissible, it must be
preceded by a warrant based on probable cause.4 Faced with exigent
circumstances, the Government may forgo the warrant, but it still must have
probable cause to undertake such a search.5 Occasionally when confronted
with "special needs," the Government may demand the extraction and
testing of a person's blood if it can show that its interest in so doing
1. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966).
2. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
3. Id. at 772.
4. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
5. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71.
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outweighs the person's interest in privacy.6
During the 1980s, the Government acquired a new instrument in the
investigation of crime when the analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
emerged and gained increased scientific acceptance.7 With this technique,
the Government can now determine whether a sample of blood from a
known person "matches" blood left at the scene of the crime by an
unknown offender.' This analysis can also be used to exculpate a
suspect.9
Once DNA testing gained wider acceptance, the Government realized
that it possessed a valuable investigative tool. In order to obtain a sample
of blood from a known provider, the Government began to use the
subpoena power of the grand jury to demand that suspects appear and
undergo extraction of blood for DNA analysis.'" Individuals, not charged
with or even accused of an offense, received subpoenas demanding that
they present themselves for withdrawal of such a sample for testing."
This practice raises serious constitutional issues because the Govern-
ment does not have to make any preliminary showing before it serves such
a subpoena. 2 In order to demand a sample of blood for a grand jury
investigation, a prosecutor merely requests a blank subpoena from the court
clerk,13 fills in the form,14 and asks a United States Marshal to serve it
upon the witness. 5 The subpoena is presumed to be reasonable.1
6
This Article examines the question of whether using a subpoena in this
way violates the Fourth Amendment. It analyzes whether such a subpoena
involves a "search" under the Fourth Amendment and if so, whether it is
"reasonable." The Article concludes that such a subpoena does involve a
search, and that it therefore must be preceded by a showing of probable
cause. Because grand jury subpoenas currently do not require such a
6. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20.
7. OFFIcE OF TECHNOLOGY AssEssMENT, GENETC WrINESs: FoRENSIC USES OF DNA
TESTS 14 (Linda Starke ed., 1990) [hereinafter GENETIC WrrNEss]; People v. Wheeler, 636
N.E. 2nd 1129, 1130-31 (Ill. App Ct. 1994).
8. GENETIC WITNESS, supra note 7, at 6.
9. Id. at 17.
10. E.g., In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. 1196, 1197 (W.D. Ky. 1993); Henry v.
Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247, 249 (N.D. Ill. 1991); United States v. Infelise, 773 F. Supp. 93, 95
(N.D. II. 1991); Grand Jury v. Marquez, 604 N.E.2d 929, 931 (111. 1992); Woolverton v.
Grand Jury, 859 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
11. In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. at 1197; Henry, 775 F. Supp. at 249; Marquez,
604 N.E.2d at 931; Woolverton, 859 P.2d at 1113.
12. FED. R. CRim. P. 17(a).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. FED. R. CRlM. P. 17(d).
16. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991).
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preliminary showing before they are served, the Article maintains that they
violate the Fourth Amendment.
Part II of the Article reviews the modem grand jury's investigative
function and its power to subpoena witnesses and evidence. Part III
discusses the interaction between the Government's power to subpoena and
the Fourth Amendment. Part IV addresses the constitutionality of a grand
jury subpoena for blood. Part V proposes changes to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure regarding the requirements for such subpoenas. The
Article concludes that these changes must be made to ensure that a sub-
poena for blood does not violate the recipient's Fourth Amendment rights.
II. The Modem Federal Grand Jury' 7
The federal grand jury" consists of sixteen to twenty-three persons 19
who are summoned by the cour2 to serve for a period of up to eighteen
months." The grand jury has two responsibilities. As an investigatory
body,23 it gathers and examines evidence to determine whether a suspect
has committed a federal offense.24 As an accusatory body, it determines
whether probable cause exists and thus whether it can indict the target of
its investigation.25
Three vital features characterize the modem grand jury-independence,
secrecy, and expansive powers. The Supreme Court has frequently
17. It is beyond the scope of this Article to include a history of the grand jury. For a
discussion of this subject, see 1 SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW
AND PRACTICE 1-41 (1987); MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTAuS, THE GRAND JURY:
AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 3-17 (1977); RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE
GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES 1634-941 (1963).
18. Due to the variations among the different states grand juries, this Article focuses on
the federal grand jury. The federal constitutional analysis which follows applies to both
federal and state grand juries.
19. 18 U.S.C. § 3321 (1988); FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(a).
20. FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(a).
21. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(g). The court may extend the 18 month period of service for a
maximum additional period of six months. Id.
22. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974).
23. This Article focuses on the investigatory function of the grand jury because it is in
this capacity that subpoenas for blood samples are issued.
24. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343-44 ("A grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing
in which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudicated. Rather, it is an ex parte
investigation to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal
proceedings should be instituted against any person."); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 687-88 (1972) (stating that a grand jury has broad powers of investigation to determine
whether a particular individual should be charged with a crime).
25. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343-44.
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reiterated the significance of each of these features and has acted to ensure
that none of them is compromised. 26 Whether a grand jury subpoena for
blood is an unreasonable search is a thorny question, for if it is, the Court
must impose constitutional restraints on the grand jury's authority to sub-
poena such evidence. Such restraints collide with each of the grand jury's
three vital characteristics.
A. Independence of the Grand Jury
Recently the Court declared that the grand jury "belongs to no branch
of the institutional government."2 7 Instead, it serves "as a kind of buffer
or referee between the Government and the people." '2  Although it
functions with the support of the judiciary,29 the grand jury may not be
controlled by the courts. 30
The grand jury's independence emanates from its history.31 The
range and the exercise of its power evinces its autonomy.32 A judge does
not preside over its proceedings.33 Although the court summons individu-
als to serve on the grand jury,3 appoints the foreperson and deputy
foreperson, 35 and enforces grand jury subpoenas, 36 it is not involved in
the day-to-day operation of the body. Due to the high value placed on the
grand jury's independence, the United States Supreme Court has made it
clear that, despite frequent requests to do so,37 it will not use its supervi-
sory power38 to impose rules of procedure for the grand jury.39
26. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1742-44 (1992) (stating that the
grand jury is independent from the judicial branch and that it has expansive power to regulate
its own activities); United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297-99 (1991) (reviewing
the qualities of grand jury proceedings that include strict secrecy and broad powers of
investigation); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 342-45 (explaining that the grand jury can go beyond
rules of evidence in their investigation and that its meetings are conducted in secret); Costello
v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-63 (describing the power and independence a grand jury
enjoys in order to reach its decisions).
27. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1742.
28. Il
29. For example, the grand jury generally meets in the courthouse. Id. Its procedures are
governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6 and 17.




34. Id (referring to FED. R. CRM. P. 6(a)(1)).
35. Il (referring to FED. R. Cm. P. 6(c)).
36. Id. at 1743.
37. Id.
38. Id. (refusing to use its supervisory power to require that a prosecutor present
substantial exculpatory evidence to a grand jury).
39. Id.; see also, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350 (1974) (refusing to apply
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Despite the ostensible importance of independence, prosecutors, as
representatives of the Executive branch, assume a critical role in the work
of the grand jury.40 Not only do prosecutors select which matters to bring
to the grand jury,41 but they also decide which witnesses42 and evidence
to subpoena.4 3  They examine the witnesses before the grand jury,4
decide what evidence to submit to that body,45 and prepare the indictment
for the grand jury's review. 46
Prosecutors may serve a subpoena without securing the prior approval
of the grand jury.' After reviewing evidence received pursuant to a
the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to grand jury proceedings); Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956) (refusing to apply hearsay rule to the grand jury
proceedings).
40. Bennett L. Gersham, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Pn-r. L. REV. 393, 400-01 (1992);
see also James F. Holderman, Preindictment Prosecutorial Conduct In The Federal System,
71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 5 (1980) (stating that investigations by the grand jury are
controlled primarily by prosecutors).
41. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
825 (1977); In re Grand Jury (Arrington), 782 F. Supp. 1518, 1522 (N.D. Ala. 1992),
dismissed as moot in part, affirmed in part, 955 F.2d 670 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
42. Holderman, supra note 40, at 5 n.42; Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 80 n. 11 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) ( "In this sense, the term 'grand jury subpoena,' can be a bit misleading, inasmuch
as it implies a grand jury decision to compel testimony or the delivery of documents. It is
important to realize that a grand jury subpoena gets its name from the intended use of the
testimony, or documentary evidence, not from the source of its issuance.").
43. Holderman, supra note 40, at 5 n.42; Doe, 779 F.2d at 80 ("Rather, grand jury
subpoenas are issued at the request, and in the discretion of the prosecuting attorney involved
in the case. . . "); In re New Haven Grand Jury, 604 F. Supp. 453, 460 (D. Conn. 1985) ("It
is equally true, however, that no grand jury, 'runaway' or otherwise, is vested with the
discretionary power to determine whether a prosecution shall be commenced or maintained.
It is well to remember that the commencement of a federal criminal case by submission of
evidence to a grand jury is 'an executive function within the exclusive prerogative of the
Attorney General."'); United States v. Kleen Laundry & Cleaners, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 519,
521-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) ("It is now the United States Attorney who gathers the evidence for
later presentation to the grand jury. He calls and examines witnesses, presents documents,
explains the law, sums up the evidence and requests an indictment .... Though the grand jury
may request evidence, the function of issuing process to obtain it belongs to another. It is the
prosecutor who has the initiative and power by subpoena to bring proof to the courthouse.").
44. In re Grand Jury (Arrington), 782 F. Supp. at 1522.
45. Chanen, 549 F.2d at 1312.
46. Il
47. United States v. Anglian, 784 F.2d 765, 769 (6th Cir. 1986) ("This court has held that
a United States Attorney may properly issue a grand jury subpoena without prior direction
from the grand jury .... "); United States v. Santucci, 674 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1109 (1983) (holding there was no "problem with permitting the United
States Attorney to fill in blank grand jury subpoenas requiring the identification material
without actual prior grand jury authorization"); In re Melvin, 546 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1976)
("he United States Attorney may obtain subpoenas issued in blank by the court, fill in the
blanks, and have the witnesses served without consulting the grand jury.") (citations omitted).
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subpoena, prosecutors may make a variety of choices. For example, they
may decide not to present the evidence to the grand jury,4" or they may
choose to offer it to a grand jury other than the one for whom it was
originally subpoenaed.49 Through this substantial discretion, prosecutors
initiate and control the grand jury investigations. 50
B. Secrecy of the Grand Jury
When the English institution of the grand jury was adopted in
Eighteenth Century America, it came complete with confidentiality
provisions.5" Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
(FRCRP) codified these requirements. 2
Secrecy53 safeguards the impartiality of the grand jury and ensures
its autonomy from the Government.54 The Supreme Court has recognized
48. Holderman, supra note 40, at 8.
49. United States v. Gakoumis, 624 F. Supp. 655, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1985) ("[H]aving one
grand jury subpoena evidence and another grand jury presented with the evidence is
[unquestionably proper]."); In re Immunity Order, 543 F. Supp. 1075, 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
("[S]ubpoenaed documents need not be presented exclusively to the grand jury in whose name
they were first demanded."); United States v. Kleen Laundry & Cleaners, Inc., 381 F. Supp.
519, 523 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) ("That a different grand jury from the one which subpoenas the
evidence is presented with that evidence is of little import.").
50. In re New Haven Grand Jury, 604 F. Supp. 453, 460 (D. Conn. 1985). This fact has
led to the following comment by one jurist:
This great institution has long ceased to be the guardian of the people for which
purpose it was created at Runnymede. Today it is but a convenient tool for the
prosecutor-too often used solely for publicity. Any experienced prosecutor will
admit that he can indict anybody at any time for almost anything before any grand
jury.
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (quoting Senior District Judge William
Campbell).
51. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. at 211, 218 n.9 (1979).
52. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) provides:
General Rule of Secrecy. A grand juror, an interpreter, a stenographer, an operator
of a recording device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an attorney for
the government, or any person to whom disclosure is made under paragraph
(3)(A)(ii) of this subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand
jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. No obligation of secrecy
may be imposed on any person except in accordance with this rule. A knowing
violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court.
FED. R. CRim. P. 6(e)(2).
53. For a detailed discussion of the grand jury's secrecy provisions, see J. Robert Brown,
Jr., The Witness and Grand Jury Secrecy, 11 AM. J. CRiM. L. 169 (1983); Richard M. Calkins,
Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH L. REV. 455 (1965); Andrea M. Nervi, Comment, FRCRP 6(e)
and the Disclosure of Documents Reviewed by a Grand Jury, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1990).
54. Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 629 (1990).
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that secrecy serves other interests as well."5 For example, it encourages
witnesses to come forward and testify candidly because they are assured
that their testimony will be kept secret from others, including those under
investigation. 6 It also diminishes the risk that a potential indictee will
seek to influence a witness's testimony or will flee from the jurisdiction
upon learning of the investigation. 7 In addition, secrecy reduces the harm
to those who are investigated but ultimately are exonerated. 8
Secrecy, however, is not absolute.59 A court may order the disclosure
of grand jury transcripts upon the request of either the Government or the
defendant.6 The Supreme Court has recognized that in the face of
"compelling necessity,"' 6' it will consider granting an exception to the
confidentiality provisions. 2 In making such a decision, the Court will
balance the individual's interest in disclosure against the public's interest
in secrecy.63 The burden of showing compelling need is on the parties
seeking disclosure. They must show that "the material they seek is needed
to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the need for
disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy, and that their
request is structured to cover only material so needed." '' A court enjoys
"substantial discretion" when deciding this issue.65 Moreover, its decision
will not be overturned unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. 6
55. IM; Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 211.
56. Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 630.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C).
Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand
jury may also be made-
(i) when so directed by a court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial
proceeding; (ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon
a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because
of matters occurring before the grand jury; (iii) when the disclosure is made by an
attorney for the government to another federal grand jury; or (iv) when permitted
by a court at the request of an attorney for the government, upon a showing that
such matters may disclose a violation of state criminal law, to an appropriate
official of a state or subdivision of a state for the purpose of enforcing such law.
If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the
disclosure shall be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions
as the court may direct.
Id.
60. Id.
61. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
62. Ia
63. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 222 (1979).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 223.
66. Id. at 228.
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C. Expansive Power of the Grand Jury
The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that the grand jury's
historic mission of investigating crimes and indicting offenders requires an
exercise of broad powers.67 The proceedings are not adversarial and are
not intended to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of a suspect.6 Instead,
grand juries "determine whether a crime has been committed and whether
criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person."69  An
investigation may be initiated on the basis of "tips, rumors, evidence
proffered by the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the grand
jurors."' The Court has stressed that "[a] grand jury's investigation is not
fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all
witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been
committed."71
In order to fully investigate the matter before it, a grand jury enjoys
broad subpoena powers. The Supreme Court has stated that a summoned
individual has a public duty to appear in court to testify.72 Despite
burden, inconvenience, or sacrifice, a subpoenaed person must appear as a
"necessary contribution of the individual to the welfare of the public."73
Refusal to comply with a subpoena may lead the court to find an individual
in either civil" or crimina contempt.
67. See, e.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919); see also United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); United
States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 510 (1943).
68. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343.
69. Id. at 343-44.
70. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 344 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,701-02 (1972)
(citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956))).
71. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 13 (1973) (quoting United States v. Stone, 429
F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970)).
72. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 280-81 (1919).
73. Id. at 281.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1994).
(a) Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand
jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply with an order
of the court to testify or provide other information, including any book, paper,
document, record, recording or other material, the court, upon such refusal, or
when such refusal is duly brought to its attention, may summarily order his
confinement at a suitable place until such time as the witness is willing to give
such testimony or provide such information. No period of such confinement shall
exceed the life of-
(1) the court proceeding, or
(2) the term of the grand jury, including extensions,
before which such refusal to comply with the court order occurred, but in no event
shall such confinement exceed eighteen months.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988) ("A court of the United States shall have power to punish by
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The modem provisions for issuing and serving subpoenas in criminal
cases appear in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. FRCRP 17(a)
provides for a subpoena ad testificandum, directing an individual to attend
and give testimony at a certain time and location.' FRCRP 17(c)
provides for a subpoena duces tecum, requiring the recipient to appear and
produce designated "books, papers, documents or other objects." "8
Pursuant to FRCRP 17, the clerk, rather than a judge, issues a
subpoena under the seal of the court.79  The subpoena merely states the
name of the court and the title of the proceeding. It directs the recipient to
appear to testify8° and/or to produce certain papers or objects."1 The
remainder of the form is blank. 2 The party seeking to serve the subpoena
must fill in the blanks.83 Prior judicial approval is generally not required
before a subpoena is issued or served.84 A subpoena is easier to secure
fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as...
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or command.").
76. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g) ("Contempt. Failure by any person without adequate excuse
to obey a subpoena served upon that person may be deemed a contempt of the court from
which the subpoena issued or of the court for the district in which it issued if it was issued by
a United States magistrate.").
77. FED. R. CRiM. P. 17(a).
For Attendance of Witnesses; Form; Issuance. A subpoena shall be issued by the
clerk under the seal of the court. It shall state the name of the court and the title,
if any, of the proceeding, and shall command each person to whom it is directed
to attend and give testimony at the time and place specified therein. The clerk
shall issue a subpoena, signed and sealed but otherwise in blank to a party
requesting it, who shall fill in the blanks before it is served. A subpoena shall be
issued by a United States magistrate in a proceeding before him, but it need not
be under the seal of the court.
Id
78. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects. A subpoena may also
command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers,
documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion made
promptly may quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable
or oppressive ....
Id
79. FED. R. CRim. P. 17(a).
80. Id.
81. FED. R. CRiM. P. 17(c).
82. FED. R. CiuM. P. 17(a).
83. Id
84. See Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of Pa., 975 F.2d 102, 108 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[N]either
Rule 17 nor any other provision in the federal rules or statutes allows for judicial intervention
before a subpoena is served.... [N]othing in Rule 17 grants to the district court what Rule
3.10 purports to do by means of a local rule: the power to screen grand jury subpoenas prior
to service."). Butsee United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir. 1986), vacated, opinion
withdrawn, 832 F.2d 664, 667, 668 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that the federal district
[Vol 22:327336
Vampires Among Us
than a search warrant because a subpoena does not involve the judiciary and
does not require a preliminary showing of probable cause.85 Moreover, in
all cases, a grand jury subpoena is presumed to be reasonable.86
Because of the "special role" of the grand jury, the Court will not
permit any "technical rules" to delay or disrupt its operation. 7 Thus, a
facially valid indictment based on either inadequate or incompetent evidence
is not subject to challenge.8 The Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule
does not apply to grand jury proceedings.89 A prosecutor need not present
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury before it returns an indictment.90
The power of the grand jury, however, is not without limits. The
Court has repeatedly declared that a grand jury may not abridge the rights
of the individual while exercising its broad investigatory powers.9 '
Consequently, a grand jury may not engage in a fishing expedition. 92 It
may not use its power to harass or malign an individual,93 and it may not
violate a witness's valid exercise of a Constitutional, statutory or common
law privilege.94 Likewise, the subpoena power of the grand jury is not
"some talisman that dissolves all constitutional protections."'95 Conse-
quently, a subpoena may not be used to harass the press or disrupt its
operations in violation of the First Amendment. 6 Similarly, it may not
be used to force a witness to incriminate himself in violation of his Fifth
Amendment privilege,97 and it may not invade an individual's legitimate
expectation of privacy in violation of the Fourth Amendment.98
Pursuant to FRCRP 17(c), subpoena recipients may move to quash a
subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.99 Under the
Fourth Amendment, a recipient may challenge the subpoena on the grounds
that it is constitutionally unreasonable."t Part III of this Article examines
court could adopt a local rule which requires prosecutors to seek prior judicial approval before
serving a grand jury subpoena to obtain evidence from an attorney about his clients).
85. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 562-63 (1978).
86. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991).
87. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
88. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1956).
89. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350 (1974).
90. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1742 (1992).
91. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
92. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 480 U.S. 292, 299 (1991).
93. Id.
94. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974).
95. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973).
96. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707-08 (1972).
97. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973).
98. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346.
99. FED. R. CIuM. P. 17(c).
100. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 56 (1906).
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the interaction between the Government's power to subpoena and a person's
Fourth Amendment rights.
II. The Government's Power to Subpoena and the Fourth Amendment
For most of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court has been
unwilling to fully apply the Fourth Amendment to a subpoena for
evidence. °10 Although it had once treated a subpoena just like any other
Fourth Amendment "search,"'" ° for practical reasons, the Court abandoned
this perspective and limited the applicability of the Constitution to a
subpoena.'0°
In 1886, the Supreme Court considered for the first time whether the
Government's demand for personal papers constituted an unreasonable
search or a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.' 4 In Boyd v. United
States,"°5 the Court analyzed the constitutionality of a statute that autho-
rized the Government to compel a partnership' 6 to produce an invoice for
use as evidence against the partnership at trial.'O° The Court conceded
that while such a demand does not constitute either a "forcible entry into
101. See, e.g., Hale, 201 U.S. at 73; Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186, 217 (1946); Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14-15; United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973);
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 (1976); Donovan v. Lone Star, Inc., 464 U.S. 408,
415 (1984).
102. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
103. Hale, 201 U.S. at 72-73.
104. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633. For a detailed analysis of this case, see Robert S. Gerstein,
The Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger Court, 27 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 343, 362-73 (1979); Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected
Privacy Under The Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REv. 945, 948-64 (1977)
[hereinafter Note, Formalism]; and Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-
1976), 76 MicH. L. REv. 184 (1977).
105. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
106. In Boyd the Court did not address whether Boyd and Sons, a partnership, should be
treated differently from an individual under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In later cases,
the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment does apply to such entities but that the Fifth
Amendment does not. See, e.g., Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 118 (1988); Bellis
v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1974); United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 704 (1944);
Hale, 201 U.S. at 73.
107. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 619-21. The Government moved for an order pursuant to the fifth
section of the "act to amend the customs-revenue laws and to repeal moieties" passed on June
22, 1874 (18 Stat. 186) to compel Boyd and Sons to produce the invoice. Id. at 619. The
Court granted the motion and ordered Boyd and Sons to produce the invoice. The statute
further provided that, had Boyd refused to produce the invoice after receiving this order, the
allegations in the Government's motion would be taken as "confessed." Id. at 620.
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a man's house ' "' or a "searching amongst his papers,"" it "accom-
plishes the substantial object of those acts in forcing"0 from a party
evidence against himself.""' Consequently, the Court concluded that
compelling the production of a party's papers "to establish a criminal
charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the scope of the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution ... .""
The Court further decided that the order in question was unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment because it compelled the defendant to
produce "mere evidence" to which the Government was not entitled as
opposed to stolen property or contraband to which it was entitled."' As
a result, it ruled that, by authorizing an unreasonable search and seizure, the
statute violated the Fourth Amendment.114
Additionally, the Court construed the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
together and held that the unreasonable search and seizure in Boyd also
violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. 5 It ruled
that the compelled production of these private papers for use as evidence
against Boyd at trial constituted an unreasonable search and seizure that
required the partnership to inculpate itself in wrongdoing.1 6 The Court
concluded that compelling, a party to produce his personal documents to
convict him of a crime or to forfeit his property violates the Constitution
and is "abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit the purposes
of despotic power; but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political
liberty and personal freedom."' 1
7
This expansive view of the Fourth Amendment was short-lived. Only
twenty years later, in Hale v. Henkel," 8 the Court reexamined the interac-
tion between the government's power to demand physical evidence and the
Fourth Amendment. It severely constricted the concepts it had conceived
108. Id. at 622.
109. Id.
110. The Court found that the production was compelled because if the party did not obey
the order, the allegations contained in the motion were taken as proven: "If he does not
produce them [the papers demanded], the allegations which it is affirmed they will prove shall
be taken as confessed. This is tantamount to compelling their production; for the prosecuting
attorney will always be sure to state the evidence expected to be derived from them as strongly
as the case will admit of." Id. at 621-22.
111. Id. at 622.
112. ld.
113. Note, Formalism, supra note 104, at 952-53. The Court abandoned this theory of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967).
114. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 633-35.
115. Id. at 633.
116. ld at 634-35.
117. Id. at 632.
118. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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in Boyd. 9
First, the Court divided the Fourth and Fifth Amendment analysis,120
separating the notion of an unreasonable search and seizure under the
former from compelled self-incrimination under the latter." Merely by
announcing that it "would be 'utterly impossible to carry on the administra-
tion of justice' without this writ,"'" the Court flatly declared that the
Fourth Amendment should not be read as an impediment to the court's
power to compel the production of documents."
Despite this view, the Court did not dismiss the Fourth Amendment
entirely. Instead it decided that a subpoena for the production of evidence
would constitute an unreasonable search and seizure if its scope was too
broad. 4 Applying this test to the subpoena in question, the Court held
that the subpoena was "far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as
reasonable."'" It stated that the Government would be required to
establish "some necessity" for the documents subpoenaed before the Court
would compel their production.12
In his concurrence, Justice McKenna found the Fourth Amendment
inapplicable to a subpoena duces tecum, 27 concluding that the characteris-
tics of a subpoena are distinguishable from those of a search warrant.
12
119. Id. at 71-79.
120. Id. at 72.
121. Id. at 72-73. With respect to the Fifth Amendment, the Court held that it was not
applicable in this case because the subpoena was served upon a corporate officer who could
not rely on the Fifth Amendment for protection. I at 74-75. Because the State creates a
corporation, the government may accord it special benefits and may limit its rights, including
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. "While an individual may
lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it
does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse
to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges." Id. at 75.
122. Id. at 73 (quoting Summers v. Moseley, 2 Cr. & M. 477 (1834)).
123. Id. at 75.
124. Id. at 76.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 77. The Court compared this broad subpoena duces tecum to a general warrant
and found them to be "equally indefensible." Id.
127. Id at 80 (McKenna, J., concurring) ("It is said 'a search implies a quest by an
officer of the law; a seizure contemplates a forcible dispossession of the owner.' Nothing can
be more direct and plain; nothing more expressive to distinguish a subpoena from a search
warrant.").
128. Id. at 80-81 (McKenna, J., concurring).
The distinction [between a subpoena and a search warrant] is based upon what is
authorized or directed to be done-not upon the form of words by which the
authority or command is given. 'The quest of an officer' acts upon the things
themselves-may be secret, intrusive, accompanied by force. The service of a
subpoena is but the delivery of a paper to a party-is open and aboveboard. There
is no element of trespass or force in it. It does not disturb the possession of
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Consequently, Justice McKenna rejected the majority's view that the
Government must show "necessity" in the case of an overbroad sub-
poena.
129
The decision in Hale, as one court noted, "left the applicability of the
Fourth Amendment to subpoenas duces tecum in a most confusing
state."13 This confusion stemmed from the fact that the Court was
ambivalent about whether and how the Fourth Amendment applied to a
grand jury subpoena.131  Consequently, forty years after Hale,132 the
Supreme Court was again examining the interaction between the Fourth
Amendment and a subpoena duces tecum.
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Company v. Walling,133 two publish-
ing corporations challenged the constitutionality of administrative subpoenas
served upon them by the Department of Labor."M The subpoenas sought
corporate records to determine whether the publishers were disobeying the
Fair Labor Standards Act.135 The publishers contended that these subpoe-
nas constituted unreasonable intrusions because they authorized the
Government to sift through the companies' records to gather evidence of
possible statutory violations.136
The Supreme Court quickly disposed of this argument.1 37 It doubted
whether the Fourth Amendment even applied to the subpoena power.
31
The Court distinguished a warrant from a subpoena.1 39 While the former
property. It cannot be finally enforced except after challenge, and a judgment of
the court upon the challenge. This is a safeguard against abuse the same as it is
of other processes of the law, and it is all that can be allowed without serious
embarrassment to the administration of justice.
Id
129. Id. at 81 (McKenna, J. concurring) ("Can a subpoena lose this essential distinction
from a search warrant by the generality or specialty of its terms? I think not.").
130. In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
131. Id.
None of the Justices seemed to think that such a subpoena could be issued only
'upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,' as would be required for
a search warrant. Nevertheless, except for Mr. Justice McKenna, all were of the
view that an overbroad subpoena duces tecum against an individual would be an
unreasonable search and seizure.
Id.
132. 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
133. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
134. ld at 189.
135. Id.
136. Id
137. Id. at 195.
138. James A. McKenna, The Constitutional Protection of Private Papers: The Role of
a Hierarchical Fourth Amendment, 53 IND. L.J. 55, 86 (1977).
139. Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 195.
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called for an "actual search," the latter merely required a "constructive"
one.' 4 Relying on one sentence in a text about the history of the Fourth
Amendment, 14 the Court seized upon this vague distinction to question
the applicability of the Fourth Amendment 42 to the subpoena power.1 43
Ultimately the Court would not commit to the application of the Fourth
Amendment to a government subpoena.'" Nonetheless, it recognized that
overbreadth challenges to a subpoena would be appropriate, 45 and that
those challenges should be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment. 46
In order to ensure "reasonableness," the Court set forth two require-
ments: First, the investigation for which the subpoena was issued must be
lawful. Second, the evidence sought must be relevant to that investiga-
The short answer to the Fourth Amendment objections is that the records in these
cases present no question of actual search and seizure, but raise only the question
whether orders of court for the production of specified records have been validly
made; and no sufficient showing appears to justify setting them aside. No officer
or other person has sought to enter petitioners' premises against their will, to
search them, or to seize or examine their books, records or papers without their
assent, otherwise than pursuant to orders of court authorized by law and made
after adequate opportunity to present objections, which in fact were made.
Id. (footnote omitted).
140. Id. at 202.
141. Id. at 202 n.28 ("In other words, the subpoena is equivalent to a search and seizure
and to be constitutional it must be a reasonable exercise of the power.") (quoting NELSON B.
LAssoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITTION 137 (1970)) (emphasis in original).
142. Ironically in his text, Professor Lasson explained that the Fourth Amendment did
apply to a government subpoena:
The principle there [in Boyd] laid down, however, applies equally if not more so
to the subpoena duces tecum, namely, that to compel a person in a criminal case
to furnish documents to be used against himself accomplished the purpose of a
search and seizure and violates the Fourth Amendment as to unreasonable searches
and seizures and the Fifth Amendment as to compulsory self-incrimination.
NELSON B. LAsSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTrTUTON 136 (1970) (citing Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson,
154 U.S. 447 (1894)).
143. Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 202 ("Only in this analogical sense can any question
related to search and seizure be thought to arise in situations which, like the present ones,
involve only the validity of authorized judicial orders.").
144. Id. at 208 ("[The Fourth, if applicable, at the most guards against abuse only by
way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be 'particularly described,'
if also the inquiry is one the demanding agency is authorized by law to make and the materials
'specified are relevant.") (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 213 ('They are rather the interests of men to be free from officious
intermeddling, whether because irrelevant to any lawful purpose or because unauthorized by
law, concerning matters which on proper occasion and within lawfully conferred authority of
broad limits are subject to public examination in the public interest.").
146. Id. at 208 ('The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that
the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable.").
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tion. 147 The particularity requirement that is included in this reasonable-
ness inquiry would be fulfilled if the subpoena was specific and limited in
its demands 48 The Court recognized that its decision was a "compro-
mise" that had been effected to satisfy both public and private interests,149
but that it was appropriate because a subpoena implicates interests distinct
from those that a warrant implicates. 5° Consequently, different safe-
guards had to be provided for those served with a subpoena rather than a
warrant.151
Because the Supreme Court's decisions on whether the Fourth
Amendment fully applied to subpoenas were ambiguous, 52 the issue
remained unresolved. Almost thirty years after its decision in Oklahoma
Press, the Court again grappled with whether a subpoena involved either a
147. Id. at 209.
148. Id.
149. See id at 213 (balancing the "interests of men to be free from officious intermed-
dling" with the interest of the public in securing evidence).
150. Id.
151. The Court also decided that although a corporation is not protected by the Fifth
Amendment, it is somewhat protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 208. In United States
v. Morton Salt Co., the Court reiterated that a corporation is protected by the Fourth
Amendment, but not to the same extent as an individual:
[N]either incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified
right to conduct their affairs in secret ... . While they may and should have
protection from unlawful demands made in the name of public investigation,
corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to
privacy. They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact
upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities.
The Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce. Favors from the government often carry with them an enhanced
measure of regulation.
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (citations omitted).
Although Oklahoma Press involved an administrative subpoena, the Court soon made it
clear that it saw no distinction between an administrative subpoena and a subpoena issued by
a grand jury, claiming that:
The only power that is involved here is the power to get information from those
who best can give it and who are most interested in not doing so. Because judicial
power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be
relevant to issues in litigation, it does not follow that an administrative agency
charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers
of original inquiry. It has a power of inquisition, if one chooses to call it that,
which is not derived from the judicial function. It is more analogous to the Grand
Jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence
but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just
because it wants assurance that it is not.
Id at 642-43.
152. See, e.g., Oklahoma Press, 327 U.S. at 208; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 71-76
(1906).
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search or a seizure. 53 In the interim, however, the Court had dramatical-
ly changed its vision of what constituted a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment.'-'
Before 1967, in order to determine whether a Fourth Amendment
search had occurred, the Court examined whether there had been a
governmental invasion into a "constitutionally protected area." '55 How-
ever, in Katz v. United States,'56 the Court held that a search no longer
involved such a physical trespass' 57 because "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.' 58  It stressed that "the premise that property
interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been
discredited,"' 59 and that the application of the Fourth Amendment "cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure."' 6°  Instead in order to determine whether a search had
occurred, the Court would now consider whether the Government's action
"violated the privacy upon which he [the defendant] justifiably relied."'16'
The Court declared that "what a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection.... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."'
62
153. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8-18 ( 1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S.
19, 21-22 (1973). For an analysis of Dionisio, see Note, United States v. Dionisio: The
Grand Jury and The Fourth Amendment, 73 CoLUM. L. REv. 1145 (1973) (examining the
extent to which the Fourth Amendment limits prosecutorial control of the grand jury process).
154. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
155. Id. at 351. A "constitutionally protected area," was one that was named in the
Fourth Amendment: persons, houses, papers, and effects. See, e.g., Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961); Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
156. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
157. Id. at 352-53.
158. Id. at 351.
159. Id. at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967)). For a thorough
analysis of the evolution of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence from property rights to privacy
concerns, see Daniel B. Yeager, Search, Seizure and the Positive Law: Expectations of
Privacy Outside the Fourth Amendment, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 249 (1993).
160. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
161. Id. In his now famous concurring opinion, Justice Harlan set forth the test for
determining whether a search under the Fourth Amendment had occurred:
The question, however, is what protection it [the Fourth Amendment] affords to
those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference to
a 'place.' My understanding of the rle that has emerged from prior decisions is
that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 351-52 (citation omitted).
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The Court applied this new approach to the determination of whether
a Fourth Amendment search occurred in United States v. Dionisio. In that
case, the grand jury issued subpoenas to Dionisio and approximately twenty
others.163 Rather than demand the production of documents, however, the
subpoenas required the recipients to provide voice exemplars. 64 These
exemplars were to be analyzed and compared with voice recordings the
grand jury already possessed.' 6 Dionisio challenged the subpoena on
Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds.'6 The Supreme Court found no
constitutional violation. 67
With respect to the Fourth Amendment, the Court again examined
whether a subpoena involved either a seizure or a search. The Court
quickly concluded that the service of a subpoena to appear before the grand
jury does not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment.' 68 The
Court declared that a subpoena does not exert the same type of compulsion
on a person as does an arrest or an investigative stop. 69 Even though the
subpoena may cause inconvenience, it is not as abrupt or as stigmatizing as
an arrest. 70 In contrast, it is served in the same way as any other legal
process.17' If the recipient cannot appear as demanded, he can seek to
reschedule the appearance. 72
Furthermore, the Court decided that this particular directive, to provide
a voice exemplar, did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment. 173 In Katz v. United States, the Court had held that a search occurs
only when the government intrudes upon a person's reasonable expectation
of privacy,174 stressing that the Fourth Amendment does not provide any
protection for that which "a person knowingly exposes to the public."' 75




167. In Dionisio, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination did not apply because the compelled production of the voice exemplars did not
encompass any testimonial content. Id. at 5-7. Since the Government intended to use the
exemplars to analyze only the physical characteristics of the voices and not their content, the
Court held that the privilege did not apply. Id. In a companion case, the Court issued the
same ruling with respect to handwriting exemplars. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 22
(1973).
168. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 9.




173. Id. at 14-15. In a companion case, the Court reached the same conclusion with
respect to handwriting exemplars. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 22 (1973).
174. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
175. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
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According to the Court, the physical characteristics of a person's voice, "as
opposed to the content of a specific conversation," are always exposed to
the public. 76 Consequently, no person could entertain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the sound of his voice. Therefore, the directive
to provide a sample of one's voice does not constitute a search under the
Fourth Amendment.1" The Court ultimately concluded that the Govern-
ment did not need to show the "reasonableness" of this demand because the
Fourth Amendment did not apply to such a subpoena."7 '
The Court has repeatedly sought to limit the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment to a Government subpoena.'79 It has made it clear that a
subpoena does not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 8 '
It has been less clear on whether a subpoena involves a Fourth Amendment
search. 8 ' Although it has concluded that a subpoena usually does not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment,"8 2 it has left open the
question of whether under certain circumstances, a subpoena may so deeply
invade a person's reasonable expectation of privacy as to constitute a Fourth
Amendment search. Accordingly, Part IV examines whether a grand jury
subpoena for blood does so.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 14-15. Significantly, the Court recognized the constitutional distinction
between a subpoena which called for an invasion of the body and one which did not. Id,
The required disclosure of a person's voice is thus immeasurably further removed
from the Fourth Amendment protection than was the intrusion into the body
effected by the blood extraction in Schmerber. 'The interests in human dignity and
privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions on the
mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.'
Id (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966)).
178. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 15.
179. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,442-43 (1976) (holding that a grand
jury subpoena requiring the production of checks and bank records did not violate the Fourth
Amendment); Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14-16 (holding that a grand jury subpoena for a voice
exemplar did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186, 194-96 (1946) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit issuing
subpoenas for specific records that will be used to evaluate possible violations of the Fair
Labor Standards Act); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906) ("We think it quite clear that
the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment was not intended to interfere with
the power of courts to compel, through a subpoena duces tecum, the production, upon a trial
in court, of documentary evidence.").
180. Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408 (1984); Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 9 ("It is
clear that a subpoena to appear before a grand jury is not a "seizure" in the Fourth Amendment
sense."); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 9.6(a), at 556 (2nd ed. 1987).
181. Paul R. Joseph, Fourth Amendment Implications of Public Sector Work Place Drug
Testing, 11 NOVA L. REV. 605, 615-16 (1987).
182. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 180, § 9.6(a), at 556-59 (noting that demanding voice
exemplars, "handwriting exemplars, fingerprints, shoe and footprints and photographs, the
holding of a lineup, and similar procedures" pursuant to subpoenas are not seizures).
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IV. The Constitutionality of a Grand Jury Subpoena to Extract Blood
A seven-year-old girl is playing outside her home. During broad
daylight, the child is kidnapped by two unknown persons. Fifteen
months after the kidnapping, the girl's remains are found in a canyon,
twenty-two miles from her home. The federal grand jury in the
Southern District of California initiates an investigation of the crime. It
begins to focus in on a neighbor who lived near the youngster. He is a
forty-year-old man who bears no resemblance to the descriptions of the
kidnappers provided by witnesses to the offense. He does, however,
have a criminal record, including a felony conviction for child molesta-
tion. An earlier search of his car and home yielded no evidence. The
prosecutor advises the man that he is a target of a grand jury investiga-
tion into this offense. The Government serves a subpoena upon him,
demanding that he provide hair and blood samples for DNA testing. He




Since the forensic testing of DNA emerged during the 1980s, grand
juries, like the one described above, have begun to use their subpoena
power to demand samples of blood from known persons to compare with
specimens from unknown sources.184 If the DNA test revealed a "match"
between the two samples, the grand jury would have incriminating evidence
against a possible suspect. Conversely, if the analysis revealed no "match,"
the suspect could be exonerated.
DNA is a molecule that is found in the chromosomes.. 5 of cells. 8 6
183. Alan Abrahamson, Jury Subpoenas Oceanside Man inLeticia Hernandez Probe, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 1991, at Bl, B10.
184. E.g., In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. 1196, 1197 (W.D. Ky. 1993); Henry v.
Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247, 249-50 (N.D. Ill. 1991); United States v. Infelise, 773 F. Supp. 93,
95 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Grand Jury v. Marquez, 604 N.E.2d 929, 931 (111. 1992); Woolverton v.
Grand Jury, 859 P.2d 1112, 1113 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
185. William C. Thompson, Evaluating The Admissibility of New Genetic Identification
Tests: Lessons From the "DNA War," 84 J. CRiM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 26 n.18 (1993).
DNA is a long, double-stranded molecule found in the chromosomes carried in all
cell nuclei. The structure of DNA is similar to a long, twisted ladder in which the
'rungs' consist of pairs of molecules called base-pairs. There are four different
bases, labeled A, T, G, and C which always form into the base-pairs A-T and C-
G; the sequence of these base-pairs on the DNA strand constitutes the genetic
code. Although most sections of the DNA molecule vary little from individual to
individual within a species, some sections are polymorphic, which means that they
have different forms in different individuals. The different forms are called
1995]
AM. J, CRIM. L.
DNA testing'17 reveals genetic differences among different people. 88
"Like traditional genetic tests, DNA typing is used in the forensic context
to determine whether biological material from a known individual can be
linked to a sample from an unidentified specimen (i.e., whether the
individual can be included in or excluded from the population of humans
who could have deposited the biological material)."'89 The fact that each
person has a unique DNA pattern helps either identify or exclude certain
persons as criminal suspects." The use of DNA typing as a screening
device for suspects has made the procedure popular with criminal investiga-
tors and caused observers to herald it as a revolutionary crime-solving
procedure.'
Law enforcement agencies favor DNA testing over other scientific
testing for a number of reasons. For example, in cases where eyewitnesses
are not available, DNA analysis is advantageous'" because no two
people, other than identical twins, share the same genetic composition."
In addition, the test can be conducted on a wide array of biological
substances, including blood and semen, which are often found at the scene
of a crime." Because the composition of DNA does not vary from cell
to cell,19 the DNA pattern found in a person's blood is identical to that
found in the person's hair root or skin tissue.'96 Moreover, because DNA
alleles.
Id.
186. GENmIC WiTNESs, supra note 7, at 3.
187. For a detailed description of the process of DNA analysis see, Thompson, supra note
185, at 26-29; D.H. Kaye, The Admissibility of DNA Testing, 13 CARDOZO L. REV 353, 353-57
(1991).
188. Thompson, supra note 185, at 26.
189. GENETIC WrrNEsS, supra note 7, at 6.
190. Lee Thaggard, Comment, DNA Fingerprinting: Overview of The Impact of The
Genetic Witness On The American System of Criminal Justice, 61 Miss. L.J. 423, 424 (1991).
191. GENErIC WrrNss, supra note 7, at 23.
Despite the fact that only a few years have passed since DNA evidence was first
used in a U.S. criminal proceeding and that several issues, such as technical
standards, quality assurance, and civil liberties and privacy concerns, remain to be
resolved, interest in implementing DNA typing at the Federal, State, and local
levels has skyrocketed. Likewise, forensic applications of DNA analysis have
generated excitement in the international law enforcement community.
Id. In fact, one judge has declared, "DNA fingerprinting '[is] the single greatest advance in
the search for truth... since the advent of cross-examination."' Kaye, supra note 187, at 357
(citing People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (Albany County Ct. 1988)).
192. GENETIC WrrNEsS, supra note 7, at 100.
193. Id.
194. Sources for DNA evidence include blood, tissue, hair roots, semen, urine, tooth pulp,
saliva, and bone marrow. Id. at 15.
195. Id. at 100.
196. Id
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is more stable than other materials and the testing procedures are so
sensitive, examiners can analyze even small traces of older or degraded"9
samples.
DNA testing is considered a valuable.98 and integral tool in the
investigation and prosecution of crimes'99 and continues to grow as an
investigatory method. 2 ° One new area of growth has been in its use by
the grand jury. Specifically, the grand jury has become increasingly
interested in subpoenaing samples of blood for comparison with evidence
gathered by law enforcement officials.2"
197. GENErIC WrINESS, supra note 7, at 100; William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA
Typing: Acceptance and Weight Of The New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45,
51-52 (1989).
198. This is not to say that DNA testing is above reproach. For a discussion about the
concerns raised by this investigatory technique, see Thompson, supra note 185, at 22 (noting
that some courts have ruled DNA evidence inadmissible due to questionable reliability);
Thompson & Ford, supra note 197, at 45 (describing the problems with prematurely admitting
DNA tests before they have been adequately validated); Janet C. Hoeffel, Note, The Dark Side
of DNA Profiling: Unreliable Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 465 (1990) (criticizing DNA tests for their lack of scientific accuracy, legal admissibility,
and constitutionality).
199. By January 1992, DNA comparisons had been admitted into evidence in approxi-
mately 600 cases in every state but North Dakota. Rorie Sherman, DNA Evidence Dispute
Escalates, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 20, 1992, at 3, col. 1. The Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) of the United States Congress estimates that between 1986 and 1989, DNA tests were
used by law enforcement in a minimum of 2,000 investigations in at least 45 states and the
District of Columbia. GENTC WITNESs, supra note 7, at 14. By the end of 1991, the FBI
had conducted approximately 4,000 DNA tests in criminal cases. The DNA Wars, L.A. TIMES,
(Magazine), Nov. 29, 1992, at 22. Additionally, state, county, and private labs conducted
thousands more such tests. Id.
200. The government is undertaking steps to increase the use of DNA testing in the
investigation of crimes. The FBI is currently "designing a nationwide databank that would
index DNA 'profiles' of convicted offenders, based on DNA samples taken by State law
enforcement and correctional authorities." COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, DNA IDENTIFICATION
Acr OF 1993, H.R. REP. No. 45, 103d Congress, 1st Sess., at 5 (1993) (to accompany H.R.
829). During 1993, Congress considered a bill to authorize funds for the improvement of the
quality and availability of such DNA records and for the establishment of a national DNA
identification index. It seeks to amend Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968 to authorize funds to improve DNA records and to establish a DNA identification
index. It was introduced in the House on February 4, 1993 and passed on March 29, 1993.
On March 3, 1993, Senator Paul Simon introduced the bill in the Senate as S. 497. On that
same date, the bill was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Senate Bill died in
Committee. On March 15, 1995, Representative Bill McCollum introduced the DNA
Identification Grants Improvement Act of 1995 in the House of Representatives. H.R. 1241,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The bill seeks to "improve the capability to analyze
deoxyribonucleic acid" by revising the amount of money authorized for DNA identification
grants and by establishing an index to "facilitate law enforcement exchange of DNA
identification information." l On that same date, the bill was referred to the House
Committee on the Judiciary. No further action has been taken as of this time.
201. See supra note 184.
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B. A Grand Jury Subpoena for Blood is a Search Under the Fourth
Amendment
Although the United States Supreme Court has held that the service of
a grand jury subpoena does not involve a Fourth Amendment seizure,2"
it has yet to decide whether a subpoena that invades a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy encompasses a Fourth Amendment search. 3 In
deciding that a subpoena for voice exemplars did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment, the Court distinguished between a Government action that
required no bodily intrusion and one that did.2 In the former, it found
no search had taken place;20 5 in the latter, it assumed that one had
occurred.206
In Schmerber v. California2° and Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec-
utives' Association,2 8 the Court made it clear that when the Government
seeks to compel the extraction and testing of an individual's blood, it has
undertaken a search under the Fourth Amendment." 9 The Court has
stressed that such demands intrude upon "human dignity and privacy which
the Fourth Amendment protects."2 10  Although the Court has grown
increasingly reluctant to label subpoenas as searches,21' it has also
strongly suggested that Fourth Amendment protections are implicated if a
202. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973). Because of this ruling, the
remainder of this Article focuses only on whether the compelled extraction of blood by way
of a grand jury subpoena constitutes a valid search under the Fourth Amendment. It does not
discuss whether the detention needed to obtain the blood from such a recipient is lawful.
203. Lower courts have found that a subpoena that invades a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Senate
Select Comm. on Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F. Supp. 17, 222-23 (D.D.C. 1994); In re Grand
Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. 1196, 1198-1205 (W.D. Ky. 1993); In re Teegardin, 443 F. Supp.
1273, 1277-78 (D.S.D. 1978).
204. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 14.
The physical characteristics of a person's voice, its tone and manner, as opposed
to the content of a specific conversation, are constantly exposed to the public....
The required disclosure of a person's voice is thus immeasurably further removed
from the Fourth Amendment protection than was the intrusion into the body
effected by the blood extraction in Schmerber.
Id.
205. See supra notes 173-78.
206. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
207. 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
208. 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
209. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992); Ryncarz v. Eikenberry, 824 F.
Supp. 1493, 1499 (E.D. Wash. 1993); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Wash. 1993);
State v. Thomas, 407 S.E.2d 141, 151 (N.C. 1991); Commonwealth v. Downey, 553 N.E.2d
1303, 1306 (Mass. 1990).
210. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70.
211. See supra notes 118-51 and accompanying text.
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subpoena violates one's reasonable expectation of privacy.212 The Court
has explicitly declared that when the Government demands a sample of a
person's blood for analysis, it seeks to invade one's "reasonable expectation
of privacy.'213
Every court that has examined the constitutionality of a subpoena for
blood has found that it involves a search under the Fourth Amendment.
2 14
They have considered it irrelevant whether this governmental action comes
as a result of a warrant or a subpoena, because the result is the same:2 5
compelled invasion of a person's body by the government.216 Conse-
quently they have found that this Government action, whether by warrant
or subpoena, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.2 7
Additionally, the subsequent governmental analysis of the blood constitutes
a separate Fourth Amendment search of the person because it further
invades that person's reasonable expectation of privacy.
2 18
C. The Constitutional Reasonableness of a Grand Jury Subpoena for
Blood
Once a court has decided that a subpoena for blood extraction involves
a Fourth Amendment search, it must then determine whether the search is
"reasonable"2 9 under the Amendment.22  Traditionally, the Supreme
212. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973).
213. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767; see also, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989); 1 LAFAVE,, supra note 180, § 2.6(b), at 463 (footnotes omitted);
James G. Cavoli, Comment, Can the Government Get Into Your Genes? A Proposed New
York Statute for the Use of Genetic Identification to Establish Probable Cause, 55 ALB. L.
REV. 1355, 1392-93 (1992).
214. In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F.Supp. 1196, 1199 (W.D.Ky. 1993); Henry v. Ryan,
775 F. Supp. 247, 253 (N.D.Ill. 1991); Grand Jury v. Marquez, 604 N.E.2d 929, 933 (Ill.
1992); Woolverton v. Grand Jury, 859 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
215. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767-68; see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
528 (1967) ("The basic purpose of this Amendment [the Fourth], as recognized in countless
decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary
invasions by governmental officials.").
216. United States v. Davenport, No. 89-5461, 1990 WL 116742, at * 2 (4th Cir. July 26,
1990).
Blood tests of criminal defendants performed for evidentiary reasons have been
designated 'searches' under the Fourth Amendment by the Supreme Court, and
thus are subject to the warrant requirement.... Therefore, a warrant or court
order for a blood test must be supported by a sworn affidavit or oath to be valid.
Id (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Downey, 553 N.E.2d 1303, 1306 (Mass. 1990) ("An
order compelling the production of a blood sample is an intrusion that implicates protections
provided by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.").
217. See In re Grand Jury (T. S.), 816 F. Supp. at 1198; Henry, 775 F. Supp. at 264;
Marquez, 604 N.E.2d at 935.
218. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616; Cavoli, supra note 213, at 1395.
219. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
AM. J. CRIM. L.
Court has looked to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment 2 to
define reasonableness. Relying on this clause, the Court decided whether
a governmental search was lawful by examining whether it was preceded
by a valid judicial warrantm supported by probable cause.2'
1. Exigent Circumstances.-When faced with exigent circumstances,
the Government may conduct a search without a warrant. In Schmerber v.
California, the Court found that under the circumstances, compelled blood
extraction from a person arrested for Driving Under the Influence was
reasonable.224 First, it found that probable cause clearly existed for
arresting Schmerber and for charging him with this offense' as well as
for searching him.
These facts alone would not, however, justify a warrantless search. It
was necessary to determine whether the police were permitted to dispense
with prior judicial approval before invading Schmerber's body and
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .. ") (emphasis added).
220. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 618 ("To hold that the Fourth Amendment is applicable...
is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such intrusions. For the Fourth
Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreason-
able.") (citations omitted).
221. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.").
222. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
223. The Court has defined probable cause as follows:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with
probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be
proved.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). Probable cause to search exists "where
'the facts and circumstances within their (the officers') knowledge and of which they had
reasonably trustworthy information (are) sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that' objects subject to seizure are located at the place to be
searched. Id. at 175-76.
224. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).
225. Id. at 768-69. The Court made it clear, however, that this was not a search incident
to arrest and that the valid arrest of the defendant did not in itself justify the warrantless
search:
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects
forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be
obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be
found, these fundamental human interests require law officers to suffer the risk
that such evidence may disappear unless there is an immediate search.
ME. at 769-70 (emphasis added).
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extracting his blood.226 The Court found that because alcohol in the
blood diminishes over time, the officers had to act immediately. 27 Since
the police were justifiably concerned with the possible loss of evanescent
evidence if they took the time to seek a judicial warrant, the Court
concluded that there was an exigency which made it reasonable to dispense
with the warrant requirement."
The Court also ruled that the blood test used was reasonable.229 It
recognized that blood tests are an effective way to determine one's blood-
alcohol level23° and that they are commonly done with little risk or
pain.231 Furthermore, the test was performed in a reasonable manner 32
by a hospital physician 33 who conducted it under accepted medical stan-
dards.234 The Court, therefore, concluded that a warrantless extraction of
blood from a criminal defendant, not just a potential suspect, is reasonable
only if there is a "clear indication"2 35 that the extraction will produce
evidence of the alleged crime,236 if there are exigent circumstances
demanding the immediate extraction of the blood before the police can
secure a warrant,237 and if the test is reasonable2 38 and is conducted in
a reasonable manner.23 9  In the matter of bodily invasions for criminal
investigatory purposes, the Court later stressed that if there are no exigent
circumstances, not only will it evaluate reasonableness on the basis of
whether there was a valid probable cause warrant, but it will also consider
the degree of the intrusion involved and the need for the intrusion.24
226. Id. at 770.
227. Id. at 770-71.
228. Id.






235. One commentator has suggested that the requirement of a "clear indication" demands
a higher quantum of proof than probable cause. 2 LAFAvE, supra note 180, § 4.1(d), at 129-
30. But see United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540 (1985) (declaring that
the term "clear indication" as used in Schmerber required the finding of "necessity for
particularized suspicion that the evidence sought might be found within the body of the
individual").
236. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70.
237. Id. at 770.
238. Id. at 771.
239. Id.
240. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-62 (1985); see also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S.
291 (1973) (holding that the warrantless scraping of the defendant's fingernails did not violate
the Constitution). The Court first ruled that this procedure did constitute a search under the
Fourth Amendment:
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2. Reasonable Suspicion.-The Court has also decided that when
obtaining a warrant is impractical or impossible and the search is narrow
in scope, it will permit a search on less than probable cause but on more
than a mere hunch-it will allow a limited intrusion based on "reasonable
suspicion."241 Using a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of
the intrusion,242 a court must examine the type of search involved, the
context in which it was performed and the Government's need to conduct
it.2 '3 If the court concludes that there is a significant need for the search
and the search results in only a limited intrusion upon a person's privacy,
the Court will permit it on the basis of reasonable suspicion244 rather than
probable cause.245
The Court has not decided whether in circumstances different from
those in Schmerber it would permit the compelled extraction of blood from
a criminal suspect under a reasonable suspicion standard. In dicta,
however, the Court has indicated on two occasions2 46 that it may consider
a detention for another identification technique to be constitutional, even if
done on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause.241
The inquiry does not end here, however, because Murphy was subjected to a
search as well as a seizure of his person. Unlike the fingerprinting in Davis, the
voice exemplar obtained in United States v. Dionisio, supra, or the handwriting
exemplar obtained in United States v. Mara, the search of the respondent's
fingernails went beyond mere 'physical characteristics... constantly exposed to
the public'.. . and constituted the type of 'severe, though brief, intrusion upon
cherished personal security' that is subject to constitutional scrutiny.
lId at 295 (citations omitted). Nonetheless, the Court found that this search was permissible
as one incident to arrest: "On the facts of this case, considering the existence of probable
cause, the very limited intrusion undertaken incident to the station house detention, and the
ready destructibility of the evidence, we cannot say that this search violated the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 296 (citations omitted).
241. The Court has defined "reasonable suspicion" as "specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
242. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,534-35,
536-37 (1967)).
243. Id. at 21. See also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985); Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
244. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
245. Since the decision in Terry, the Court has permitted a myriad of government
intrusions based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. See, e.g., United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975) (holding that roving border patrol cars may stop
vehicles and question occupants on the basis of reasonable suspicion); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (finding that a vehicle may be stopped for a license check if the officer
has a reasonable suspicion that the driver is unlicensed or the car is not registered); Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1032 (1983) (stating that a protective search of a car's interior may
be conducted if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the car contains a weapon).
246. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
247. Cavoli, supra note 213 at 1373-76; Comment, Sally E. Renskers, Trial by Certainty:
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In Davis v. Mississippi24 and again in Hayes v. Florida,249 the
Court suggested that detaining a suspect for fingerprinting may be
permissible on the basis of reasonable suspicion. The Court reached this
conclusion for a number of reasons. First, it distinguished fingerprinting
from other police searches because the former does not involve "the probing
into an individual's private life and thoughts."2' It reasoned that finger-
printing could not be done repeatedly to harass the suspect, as only one set
of prints is required for analysis. 5 Furthermore, the Court viewed
fingerprinting as a more reliable and effective crime-solving tool than
confessions or eyewitness identifications." 2 Finally, the procedure could
be done with notice? 3 because the suspect could not destroy' his
fingerprints.'
Implications of Genetic DNA Fingerprints, 39 Emory L.J. 309, 329 (1990).
248. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
249. 470 U.S. 811 (1985).





255. As a result of the Court's decision in Davis, on October 7, 1969, Senator McClellan
introduced a bill in the Senate entitled Detention for Obtaining Evidence of Identifying
Physical Characteristics. P. Michael Drake, Comment, Detention for Taking Physical
Evidence Without Probable Cause, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 132, 144 (1972). Pursuant to this
proposed legislation, upon a showing of reasonable suspicion by police officers, a federal judge
would be authorized to issue an order requiring the person named to appear before a
magistrate, for a maximum of five hours, to provide identifying physical evidence such as
fingerprints, hair, or blood. Id. That bill died in Committee. United States v. Holland, 552
F.2d 667, 673 (5th Cir. 1977).
On March 31, 1971, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States drafted Rule 41.1, a proposed Amendment to the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure to authorize the issuance of"nontestimonial identification orders"
by federal magistrates. 52 F.R.D. 409, 462 (1971). Upon request from a federal prosecutor
or agent, the magistrate could issue such an order if the request was supported by an affidavit
setting forth: (1) probable cause to believe that an offense had been committed; (2)
"reasonable grounds, not amounting to probable cause to arrest, to suspect that the person
named or described in the affidavit committed the offense;" and (3) that the results of these
identification orders would materially aid in determining whether the suspect committed the
offense. Id. at 463 (emphasis added). The nontestimonial procedures covered by this proposed
rule included: "fingerprints, palm prints, footprints, measurements, handwriting exemplars,
voice samples, photographs, line-ups, as well as urine, saliva, hair, and blood samples." Ld.
at 466-67 (emphasis added). The Judicial Conference "specifically did not approve the
proposed Rule." Holland, 552 F.2d at 673-74. Interestingly, the Committee drew no
distinction between the procedure of extracting blood versus the taking of voice or handwriting
exemplars. Although the Supreme Court has applied different legal standards to these types
of procedures, the Committee included both procedures in its proposed amendment to the
Rules and suggested that reasonable suspicion for taking the specimens would suffice.
1995]
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There are some similarities between the identification procedure of
fingerprinting and that of DNA blood testing. Like fingerprinting, only one
sample is needed to conduct the DNA analysis.25 6 Additionally, some
experts argue that DNA testing is a highly reliable and effective crime-
solving technique.25 7 Moreover, because DNA can not be altered or
destroyed, 8 the recipient could have notice of the demand for the blood
sample.2
59
On the other hand, there are significant differences between taking
fingerprints and extracting blood. Fingerprints are, of course, constantly
visible to the public, and it has been held that there is no privacy expecta-
tion in what a person constantly exposes to the public.2 60 Consequently,
it could be argued that the taking of prints does not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search26' because fingerprints, like a person's voice262 or
a person's handwriting, 63 are always on public view and therefore carry
no privacy expectation. 64 Conversely, the Court has repeatedly stressed
that a person does have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768-69 (1966) (holding that the taking of blood
constitutes a search which requires at least probable cause and exigent circumstances); United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1973) (holding that voice exemplars do not constitute
a Fourth Amendment search); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21-22 (1973) (holding that
handwriting exemplars do not constitute a Fourth Amendment search); Note, Proposed Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41.1, 56 MINN. L. REv. 667, 691 (1972).
For a thorough discussion of this proposed amendment to the Rules, see Note, Detention
to Obtain Physical Evidence Without Probable Cause: Proposed Rule 41.1 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 712 (1972); Note, Proposed Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 41.1, 56 MN. L. REv. 667 (1972).
256. Clare M. Tande, Note, DNA Typing: A New Investigatory Tool, 1989 DUKE L.J.
474, 492 (1989).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 191-97.
258. Tande, supra note 256 at 492; Dan L. Burk, DNA Fingerprinting: Possibilities and
Pitfalls of a New Technique, 28 JuRiMErlcs J. 455, 470 (1988) ("Unlike blood alcohol levels
... DNA restriction fragment patterns do not diminish over time.").
259. Tande, supra note 256, at 492.
260. Hoeffel, supra note 198, at 530-31.
261. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 180, § 2.6(a), at 462 (footnotes omitted).
262. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973).
263. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973).
264. See also In re Grand Jury (Mills), 686 F.2d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1982) (ruling that a
grand jury subpoena for scalp and facial hairs did not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment because a person does not have an expectation of privacy in that which he
knowingly exposes to the public). In In re Grand Jury (Mills), the court likened the taking
of hair samples to the taking of fingerprints and voice exemplars and found that none of these
processes implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id.; see also United States v. Boykins, 966 F.2d
1240, 1243 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that a subpoena for fingerprints does not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
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blood.26 Similarly, fingerprinting is non-invasive; drawing blood is
invasive. Likewise, fingerprints reveal nothing more than that-a finger-
print-whereas blood samples may reveal highly confidential information
such as medical conditions and genetic disorders.2  These critical
differences establish that the withdrawal of blood, as compared to the taking
of fingerprints, deserves heightened constitutional protection because it is
more physically invasive and more personally intrusive.267
Additionally, while Davis and Hayes discuss the process of fingerprint-
ing, they address only the issue of whether a seizure to conduct this
procedure may be done on less than probable cause and, if so, what criteria
may be used to hold someone for this procedure.2  Neither case address-
es whether fingerprinting itself even constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment, let alone what standard would be used to evaluate its
reasonableness.269 Since the Court has already determined that a grand
jury subpoena does not entail a Fourth Amendment seizure,27° these two
cases are not dispositive on the standard that should be used to evaluate a
search for blood.
3. "Special Needs. "-In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
Associatio271 the Court relied on the "special needs"272 doctrine to
265. See supra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
266. Hoeffel, supra note 198, at 531.
267. As one commentator noted, "There may be a serious question as to whether the
taking of a blood sample should be allowed in this setting [pursuant to the Davis dictum about
fingerprinting], for the Supreme Court has viewed any search 'involving intrusions beyond the
body's surface' as a much more serious matter." 3 LAFAVE, supra note 180, § 9.6(b), at 573
(footnotes omitted). See also Hoeffel, supra note 198, at 532-33.
268. See 3 LAFAVE, supra note 180, § 9.6(b), at 571-73 (footnotes omitted).
269. Id. at 572-73 (footnotes omitted).
270. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
271. For a thorough analysis of Skinner, see William R. Hodkin, Rethinking Skinner and
Von Raab: Reasonableness Requires Individualized Suspicion for Employee Drug Testing, 17
J. CONTEmP. L. 129 (1991); Andrea Lewis, Comment, Drug Testing: Can Privacy Interests
Be Protected Under the 'Special Needs' Doctrine? 56 BROOK. L. REv. 1013 (1990); Heidi P.
Mallory, Note, Fourth Amendment-The 'Reasonableness' Of Suspicionless Drug Testing of
Railroad Employees, 80 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1052 (1990).
272. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619-20 (1989).
Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure in such a case
is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued
upon probable cause. We have recognized exceptions to this rule, however, when
"special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable-cause requirement impracticable." When faced with such special
needs, we have not hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests to
assess the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the
particular context.... The Government's interest in regulating the conduct of
railroad employees to ensure safety, like its supervision of probationers or
AM. J. CRIM. L.
uphold Federal Railway Administration (FRA) regulations that permitted
suspicionless blood, breath, and urine analysis of railway workers to detect
drug use. Although the Court found that these tests constituted searches
under the Fourth Amendment,273 it concluded that they were conducted
for the "special need" of deterring alcohol and drug use on the job,2 4 and
not for the usual law enforcement purpose of criminal prosecution.2 5
Because of these "special needs," the Court balanced the Government's
interests against those of the individual to determine whether it was
impractical to require either a probable cause warrant or an individualized
suspicion before conducting this search.
276
The Court decided that obtaining a warrant based on probable cause
was unnecessary under the circumstances of this testing program.277
Because the regulations clearly delineated when and upon whom these tests
could be conducted,278 there was no need for a magistrate to make this
determination.279 The Court also found that requiring the railway supervi-
sor to obtain a warrant would frustrate the purpose of the program.280 As
in Schmerber, the Court recognized that traces of drugs and alcohol
disappear from the bloodstream over the passage of time.28 Immediate
testing, without the time-consuming process of obtaining a warrant,
prevented the loss of crucial evidence.2" Additionally, the Court declared
that it was unfair to burden the supervisors with a warrant requirement
when they were unfamiliar with the subtleties of constitutional criminal
procedure. 3
The Court also rejected the need for reasonable suspicion before
performing these tests2 The Court balanced the interests of the person
against those of the Government and found that the intrusion on the
person's privacy was limited, while the Government's interest was
regulated industries, or its operation of a government office, school, or prison,
"likewise presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify
departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements."
Id (citations omitted).
273. Id. at 617.
274. Id. at 620-21.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 621.
277. Id. at 624.
278. Id. at 622.
279. Id.
280. ld. at 623.
281. Id. at 623.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 623-24.
284. Id. at 624.
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compelling."8 5 The Court declared that blood tests require only a small
quantity of blood and are commonplace, minimally intrusive,286 and
relatively painless. 287 Moreover, the employees' expectations of privacy
are reduced because they work in a heavily regulated industry that limits
their freedom of movement.
2 88
On the other hand, the Government had a compelling interest in
conducting these tests without the prerequisite of individualized suspi-
cion.289  According to the Court, testing employees was imperative to
deter drug or alcohol abuse by the workers.2" It was also necessary to
prevent train accidents or to determine their cause if they occurred.291
But detecting one who is impaired by alcohol or drugs is very difficult.2"
For example, it would be particularly troublesome to do so in the chaotic
aftermath of an accident.293 The Court reasoned that requiring the supervi-
sor to establish an individualized suspicion of the employee's impairment
before allowing testing would seriously frustrate the goal of these regula-
tions.294 The Court, therefore, ruled that the compelling interests of the
Government outweighed the minimal privacy interests of the employees295
and held that the supervisors did not need to establish individualized
suspicion before testing a particular employee.
296
The Court decided that in view of the "special needs" in this case, it
would simply balance the government's interests against the private interests
to determine the reasonableness of the search.297 It found that the
government's interest, which it viewed as "compelling," 98  out-
weighed299 the intrusion on the individual, which it viewed as "limit-
285. Id.
286. Id at 625.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 624-25, 627.
289. Id. at 628.
290. Id. at 629-30.
291. Id. at 630.
292. Id. at 628.
293. Id. at 631.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 633.
296. In a companion case, the Court held that the warrantless, suspicionless drug testing
of Customs Service employees did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Relying again on the
"special needs" doctrine and using the same analysis as in Skinner, the Court found
constitutionally reasonable the compelled urinalyses of Customs employees who sought
promotions or transfers to positions which required them to carry guns, or interdict drugs.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668-72 (1989).
297. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
298. Id. at 633.
299. Id.
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ed.' 3°  Consequently, the Court held that the regulations authorized a
reasonable search 3 1 under the Fourth Amendment."m
The "special needs" doctrine of Skinner should not be used to evaluate
the reasonableness of a grand jury subpoena for blood. 3  The extraction
of blood constituted a "special need" in Skinner because the search was not
undertaken for ordinary law enforcement objectives, but rather for civil
regulatory purposes.3° Conversely, a grand jury subpoena is used for
traditional law enforcement purposes. 5 With a subpoena, the Govern-
ment is investigating a crime' and seeking to indict a perpetrator.0 7
Certainly these are ordinary law enforcement purposes.
Additionally, the Court reasoned that railway workers have a
diminished expectation of privacy because they choose to work in a heavily
regulated industry.30 8 In contrast, a recipient of a grand jury subpoena
does not necessarily have a similarly diminished privacy expectation."
300. Id. at 628.
301. Id. at 634.
302. Id. But see Acton v. Vernonia School Dist., 23 F. 3d 1514, 1526 (9th Cir. 1994)
(deciding that suspicionless drug testing of student athletes violated both the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, § 9 of the Oregon Constitution), cert. granted, Vernonia School
Dist. v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 571 (1994); University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929 (Colo.
1993) (ruling that suspicionless drug testing of student athletes by the University of Colorado
violated the Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1646 (1994). Although the court
decided that this was a "special needs" case because the drug testing program was not designed
to serve the "ordinary needs of law enforcement," id. at 936, the court balanced the
governmental interests of this program against the private interests involved, and concluded
that the former did not outweigh the latter. Id. at 946. See also Portillo v. United States Dist.
Court for the Dist. of Ariz., 15 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a general order that
authorized probation officers to require defendants awaiting sentencing to undergo urine testing
violated the Fourth Amendment). The Ninth Circuit recognized that the "operation of a
probation system presents 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement that
may justify departures from the usual wan-ant and probable-cause requirements."' Id. at 822
(quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876-78 (1987)). Consequently, it balanced the
Government's "significant interest in determining the appropriate sentencing alternative for a
defendant... against.., the defendant's privacy interest." Id. at 823 (citation omitted). It
found that the defendant's expectation of privacy required the government to exercise "some
degree of reasonableness" in performing this search. Id. at 824. Since the record did not
include any such showing, the Ninth Circuit held that this search was unconstitutional. Id.
303. In one of the few decisions on the constitutionality of a grand jury subpoena
demnding a sample of blood, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, rejected the use of the "special needs" doctrine to evaluate the reasonableness of such
a subpoena. Henry v. Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247, 254 n.6 (N.D. I1. 1991). For a discussion of
this decision, see infra notes 332-52 and accompanying text.
304. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-21.
305. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
307. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
308. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624-25.
309. In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. 1196, 1204 (W.D. Ky. 1993); Henry v. Ryan,
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Unlike the railway worker, the subpoena recipient ordinarily has not chosen
to work in a heavily regulated industry, has not submitted to any restrictions
on personal security or privacy, and has taken no steps to submit to
invasive procedures.310 Consequently, the "special needs" doctrine could
not be used to constitutionally validate a grand jury subpoena for
blood.1
4. Balancing Interests.-In certain limited instances, even in the
absence of "special needs," the Court has upheld a criminal investigatory
775 F. Supp. 247, 254 n.6 (N.D. 111. 1991).
310. In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. at 1204; Henry, 775 F. Supp. at 254 n.6.
311. In re Grand Jury (T. S.), 816 F. Supp. at 1204-05. See also King v. Ryan, 607
N.E.2d 154 (ill. 1992) (invalidating a state statute that authorized the chemical testing of
drivers involved in accidents resulting in death or personal injury). Since the statute did not
require a probable cause determination that the driver was under the influence of drugs or
alcohol before conducting this testing, the court ruled that this statute violated the Fourth
Amendment. It refused to apply the "special needs" doctrine because the testing was for
criminal prosecution, not for the "special need" of regulating conduct. Id. at 160.
Furthermore, the drivers tested under this statute did not have a diminished expectation of
privacy as did the railway workers in Skinner. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Kohl, 615 A.2d
308, 314 (Pa. 1992) (refusing to use the "special needs" doctrine to uphold a state statute that
permitted the chemical testing of drivers involved in accidents).
But see Senate Select Comm. on Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1994)
(applying the "special needs" doctrine to determine the reasonableness of a congressional
subpoena served upon Senator Bob Packwood for his personal diaries). When Senator
Packwood challenged the subpoena on Fourth Amendment grounds, the judge held that the
subpoena called for a search. Without explanation, however, the court relied on the "special
needs" case of O'Connor v. Ortega, to evaluate the reasonableness of that subpoena.
Packwood, 845 F. Supp. at 22 (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987)). The
O'Connor court stated, "In sum, we conclude that the 'special needs, beyond the normal need
for law enforcement make the ... probable-cause requirement impracticable', for legitimate
work-related, noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct."
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (citation omitted). Consequently, the court
weighed "'the nature and quality of the intrusion on [Packwood's] Fourth Amendment interests
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion,"' and
decided that the subpoena did not violate the Senator's Fourth Amendment rights. Packwood,
845 F. Supp. at 22.
In denying the Senator's application to the United States Supreme Court for a stay
pending appeal, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that in order to decide whether the subpoena
violated the Senator's Fourth Amendment rights, the District Court had balanced Packwood's
interest in privacy against the Government's interest in obtaining the material. Because the
Senator had not challenged the use of this legal standard, however, the Chief Justice did not
comment upon the lower court's reliance on it. Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics,
114 S. Ct. 1036, 1038 (1994). In light of Supreme Court precedent, the District Court's
reliance on the "special needs" doctrine in the Packwood case is not misplaced. This was a
civil matter-a Senate Ethics Committee investigation-into Packwood's alleged misconduct
on the job. It was not a criminal investigation in which a demand for evidence was being
made to possibly charge Packwood with criminal offenses.
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seizure where less than reasonable suspicion was present." In cases
where the intrusion on the person is minimal3"3 and the need for official
action is compelling,31 the Court has abandoned the standard of reason-
able suspicion and has employed a balancing test to determine the
reasonableness of the challenged action.315 The Court weighs the per-
sons's interest against that of the Government.1 6 It permits a minimal
seizure, even in the absence of individualized suspicion, when the
Government seeks to accomplish a significant goal and the challenged
action advances that goal.317
For a number of reasons, this approach should not be used in the case
of a compelled intrusion into the body.38 First, this approach has been
used only to examine the reasonableness of a seizure, but not a search.3 19
It has been used only in cases where the degree of intrusion was viewed as
"slight 320 and the Government interest was compelling. 32'
In contrast, with respect to a subpoena for blood, the Court must
examine the reasonableness of a search not a seizure. The Court has
distinguished a search from a seizure and indicated that the former deserves
heightened Fourth Amendment protection .3' The degree of an intrusion
312. See, e.g., Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (allowing checkpoints to detect
drunk drivers since the state's interest is high and the intrusion of personal liberty is minimal);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (giving deference to the discretion of
higher ranking officials when the intrusion is minimal).
313. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451; see also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557-58 (stating that
routine checkpoints do not intrude on the right to "free passage without interruption").
314. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557.
315. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-50; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 555.
316. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-50; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 555.
317. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556-58.
318. But see People v. Wheeler, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1135 (111. App. Ct. 1994) (ruling that
a statute mandating that blood and saliva samples be taken from convicted sexual offenders
should be evaluated by balancing "the government's interest in conducting the search, the
degree to which the search actually advances that interest, and the gravity of the intrusion upon
personal privacy"). Using this approach, the court found that the statute did not violate the
Fourth Amendment. Iai
319. E.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561; see also Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450.
320. See, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451 ("[The measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped
briefly at sobriety checkpoints ... is slight."); see also Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557
("[T]he consequent intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is quite limited.").
321. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 556.
322. See infra text accompanying note 330; see also infra text accompanying note 331.
323. See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561 ("We think the same conclusion is
appropriate here, where we deal neither with searches, nor with the sanctity of private
dwellings, ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection."); see also
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984) (plurality decision) ("A seizure affects only
the person's possessory interests; a search affects a person's privacy interests. Therefore, the
heightened protection we accord privacy interests is simply not implicated where a seizure of
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for blood may not be viewed as "slight" because it implicates the "most
personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy,"3" namely, the privacy
of a person's own body.3" The Government's interest in this case is the
same as it is in any criminal investigation-seeking evidence to solve a
crime. Unlike an immigration" or sobriety checkpoint,327 where the
Court evaluated the reasonableness of such seizures by using a balancing
test, a subpoena for a sample of blood does not involve a pervasive,
institutionalized scheme. It merely concerns the resolution of one particular
offense. This does not constitute the compelling societal interest found in
the cases" where the balancing approach was used.329
D. The Lower Courts' Examination of a Grand Jury Subpoena to Extract
Blood
Only a few courts have examined the issue of whether a grand jury
subpoena for a blood sample constitutes an unconstitutional search.33
The courts agree that the extraction of blood constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment.331 They disagree, however, on the standard that
should be used to evaluate the reasonableness of the search.
In the first published 332 opinion on the issue,333 the United States
premises, not a search, is at issue.") (Burger, C.J. & O'Connor, J., concurring).
324. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985).
325. Id.
326. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 543.
327. Michigan v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
328. Id.; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 543.
329. But see In re Teegardin, 443 F. Supp. 1273, 1277-78 (D.S.D. 1978). The court ruled
that if it were to enforce the subpoena, the Government would have to show that: (1) the
grand jury's investigation was authorized by law; (2) the investigation was proceeding
according to a legitimate purpose; (3) the items sought were relevant to the investigation; and
(4) the intrusion into the Fourth Amendment was reasonable under the circumstances. Id. To
determine reasonableness, the court would balance the interests of the public in a thorough
investigation against the inconvenience to the witness. Id. In this case, the court concluded
that although the subpoena was inconvenient and bothersome, it was not oppressive or unrea-
sonable. Id. Because a subpoena for blood is more invasive and revealing, however, it is not
comparable to one for financial records. See infra notes 421-22 & 440-46 and accompanying
text.
330. United States v. Under Seal, No. 86-5134, 1987 WL 37526, at *2 (4th Cir. May 21,
1987); In re Grand Jury (T. S.), 816 F. Supp. 1196, 1200-06 (W.D. Ky. 1993); Henry v. Ryan,
775 F. Supp. 247, 253-56 (N.D. Ill. 1991); Woolverton v. Grand Jury, 859 P. 2d 1112, 1114-
16 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993). Other courts may have reviewed the issue, but have not
published opinions of their decisions. See, e.g., supra note 183 and accompanying text.
331. See infra notes 350, 354 & 404 and accompanying text.
332. In 1987, the Fourth Circuit issued an unpublished, per curiam decision on the
constitutionality of a subpoena for blood. Under Seal, No. 86-5134, 1987 WL 37526 (4th Cir.
May 21, 1987). In that case, a South Carolina prison inmate received a federal grand jury
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District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that a subpoena for
the extraction of blood constitutes a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment that must be supported by only reasonable suspicion.335
The facts of Henry v. Ryan are uncontroverted. DuPage County
Deputy Sheriff George Wick was investigating a possible murder.
Although he did not suspect Dana Henry, Wick called Henry and asked him
to come to his office to answer some questions.336 Henry complied. One
week later, Wick called Henry again and asked him to come to the office
to provide blood and saliva samples. Henry refused.
The sheriff then served Henry with a grand jury subpoena demanding
that he provide the samples. Henry moved to quash the subpoena, but the
court denied the motion and ordered Henry to comply. He again refused.
The court held him in contempt and ordered him incarcerated until he
complied.
When Henry was booked into jail, he was found to be suicidal.
Consequently, all his clothes were taken from him and he was placed naked
and alone in an observation cell. 337 After eight hours in the cell, Henry
relented and provided the samples.338 Henry was never arrested or
charged in connection with this investigation.339
As a result of his experience, Henry filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging that the County, the Sheriff, and other government officials
subpoena demanding a sample of his blood. The Court of Appeals found that the lower court
had "authority to authorize reasonable force" to obtain the sample because the witness was
already incarcerated. Id. at *1. Additionally the court upheld the district court's order for the
sample because it was "a routine, minimal physical intrusion" that allowed "the grand jury to
obtain... highly relevant and probative [evidence]." Id.
Certainly the standard used to evaluate the taking of a sample from an incarcerated person
should differ substantially from that used to judge the intrusion on a free individual. See Jones
v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that because an incarcerated felon has
only limited constitutional rights, the Fourth Amendment does not demand a finding of either
probable cause or reasonable suspicion before blood can be drawn from him); Walker v.
Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 386 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the compelled drawing of a blood
specimen from a prison inmate may be done for a "legitimate penological objective"); Ryncarz
v. Eikenberry, 824 F. Supp. 1493, 1500. (E.D. Wash. 1993) (holding that no showing of
probable cause or reasonable suspicion must be made to extract an inmate's blood, but that the
Government must show "evidence of a legitimate penological objective for that type of
search").
333. Henry, 775 F. Supp. at 247.
334. Id. at 253.
335. d. at 254.
336. Id at 249.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 250.
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violated his civil rights.3 The defendants moved to dismiss the com-
plaint on a number of grounds, including that the subpoena did not violate
Henry's rights under the Fourth Amendment.34 1  The court denied the
342motion.
In reaching its decision, the court first concluded that the extraction of
blood and saliva constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment.
343
The court then considered whether the search was reasonable. 3' Al-
though conceding that reliance on Schmerber would lead to the conclusion
that "probable cause is a necessary element of a grand jury subpoena
compelling a bodily intrusion,"'" the court nonetheless found that such
a requirement is "untenable in the grand jury situation, ' 3' because the
very "purpose of a grand jury is to determine whether there is probable
cause to charge an individual with a crime., 347  According to the court,
it would be "inconsistent" to demand that a grand jury establish probable
cause to search while it was investigating whether there was probable cause
to indict. 48
Yet the court realized that the power of the grand jury is not unlimited
and that the "evidence collected by a grand jury must still be relevant and
particularized. '349  While rejecting a probable cause standard, the court
concluded that in order to ensure that evidence sought is both relevant and
particularized, the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion30 should be
applied to such subpoenas.351 Since there was a possibility that no
individualized suspicion supported this subpoena, the court refused to
dismiss the complaint. 52
Two years later, the United States District Court for the Western
340. Id.
341. Id. at 252.
342. Id. at 255.
343. Id. at 253.
344. Id.






351. The court specifically rejected the use of the "special needs" doctrine because the
subpoena did not involve the civil matter of "employee drug-testing." Nonetheless, the court
stated that even if the balancing test used in Skinner was applied, the court would still find that
a showing of individualized suspicion was required because unlike the railway workers in
Skinner, Henry did not have a reduced expectation of privacy. Additionally, unlike the drug-
testing program in Skinner, the grand jury would not be jeopardized by requiring that it
establish individualized suspicion before demanding the blood sample. Id. at 254, 255 n.6.
352. Id at 255.
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District of Kentucky rejected Henry's conclusion that reasonable suspicion
would suffice to find a grand jury subpoena demanding the extraction of
blood to be reasonable.353 In In re Grand Jury (TS.), the Court relied on
Schmerber and declared that such a subpoena does constitute a search
which may only be conducted after a judicial finding of probable cause. 54
The facts in In re Grand Jury (TS.) raise Fourth Amendment issues
similar to those in Henry. On October 26, 1989, T.S.'s daughter disap-
peared. 35 5  Three years later, the Government sought to compare T.S's
blood with other samples it had found so it served T.S. with a grand jury
356subpoena demanding a blood specimen. T.S. moved to quash the
subpoena contending that, inter alia,357 it violated his Fourth Amendment
rights.358 The court agreed and granted the motion. 9
In its decision, the court reiterated the principles of Schmerber and
declared that because intrusions into the body are so invasive of a person's
privacy, they should be permitted "only in stringently limited circumstanc-
es. ' 3 ° If the Government conducts such a search without a warrant, then,
at a minimum, there should be probable cause and exigent circumstances
to support it.361 The court found that, unlike in Schmerber, there were no
exigent circumstances here.362  Neither the passage of time, nor T.S.
himself, could change or destroy the composition of his blood.363 In
further contrast to Schmerber, the demand for the blood was not incident
to a valid arrest supported by probable cause but came through a subpoena
which did not even indicate whether T.S. was a target of the investiga-
353. In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. 1196 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
354. In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. at 1200.
Under the reasoning of Schmerber and Winston, we believe that the compulsory
extraction of blood samples is permissible under the Fourth Amendment only in
stringently limited circumstances.... Without a warrant or valid arrest, a search
and seizure consisting of compulsory blood extraction and testing will be
constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment only (1) where there is
probable cause to believe that incriminating evidence will be found and (2) exigent
circumstances require immediate action.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
355. Id. at 1197.
356. Id
357. T.S. also argued that the subpoena violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Id at 1197. The court quickly rejected this argument by relying on the
holding in Schmerber, where the Supreme Court ruled that a blood test is not testimonial and,
therefore, does not implicate the Fifth Amendment. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. at 1206.







The court dismissed the contention that probable cause was not
required because the demand in this case was made by a grand jury
subpoena.365 Although it recognized that the Supreme Court, in United
States v. R. Enterprises, Inc.,36 had declared that the grand jury need not
have probable cause to issue a subpoena, the district court found that
principle inapplicable here.367 The court found that in R. Enterprises, the
grand jury was demanding documents pursuant to FRCRP 17(c),368 while
in this case, the grand jury was demanding blood which "is not clearly
within the scope of Rule 17(c)."3 69  Additionally, it reasoned that a
demand for a sample of one's blood raises different privacy concerns from
those associated with a subpoena seeking documents.370 Lastly, it
recognized that the challenge to the subpoena in R. Enterprises was based
on FRCRP 17(c), and, therefore, it only concerned the reasonableness
standards under that rule; it did not address constitutional limits. 371 The
court stressed that due to the significant "difference inherent in a search
requiring bodily intrusion and the special sensitivity with which such
searches must be viewed, we believe that R. Enterprises neither constrains
us in our Fourth Amendment inquiry nor directs our analysis. 372
The court declined to use the reasonable suspicion standard to evaluate
such a subpoena.373 It questioned the Henry court's conclusion that a
probable cause requirement in this context was unworkable. 374 The court
distinguished probable cause for the return of an indictment from that
required for the issuance of a search warrant375 and stated, "[A]n indict-
ment requires that the grand jury ascertain whether there is probable cause
that a crime has been committed and a particular person committed the
crime.' 376  This standard requires particularity, focusing on a certain
crime and a certain perpetrator.3"
364. Id.
365. Id. at 1205.
366. 498 U.S. 292 (1991). For an analysis of United States v. R. Enters., Inc., see Daniel
E. Chefitz, Note, Fourth Amendment-The Presumption of Reasonableness of a Subpoena
Duces Tecum Issued By A Grand Jury, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829 (1992).
367. In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. at 1200-02.
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In contrast, a search warrant requires that there be "a fair probability
that evidence of a crime will be found in the place searched., 378 This is
a flexible standard determined under the totality of the circumstances.379
It focuses on possible evidence of a crime rather than the particular charge
that may be filed or the particular person that may be accused.380
Consequently, by ordering the grand jury to establish probable cause before
enforcing a subpoena compelling a bodily intrusion, the court would not be
demanding that the grand jury reach the ultimate conclusion that it is
generally required to make: that there is probable cause for an indict-
ment.
381
The court also dismissed the notion that a probable cause requirement
would interfere with the efficient functioning of the grand jury.3 82 The
court recognized that the Government often resorts to search warrants either
before a grand jury investigation has begun or while it is progressing.8 3
Consequently, there would be no significant impediment to the grand jury
if the court required a showing of probable cause before a blood sample
was demanded.384 In addition, the court rejected the Henry court's
adoption of an individualized suspicion standard because it believed that it
emanated from a misplaced reliance38 5 on Skinner. Unlike the Federal
Railway Administration's explicit directives, here there were "no narrowly
defined regulations or other guidelines to govern the compulsory extraction
of T.S's blood samples or to limit the discretion of those seeking to obtain
the samples. 38 6 Additionally, unlike the railway workers, the subpoena
recipient had no diminished expectation of privacy.3 7 Finally, in contrast
to the blood-alcohol evidence in Skinner, DNA does not change or
disappear with the passage of time,388 so there is no concern about the
evanescence of the relevant evidence. 389 Therefore, the Court concluded
that Skinner was inapplicable and that the grand jury subpoena for blood
violated T.S's Fourth Amendment rights.3 °





382. Id at 1204.
383. Id
384. l
335. Id. at 1203-04.
386. Id. at 1204.
387. Id.





probable cause, using one to obtain a sample of an individual's blood would
be unconstitutional.39" ' The Government would have to procure a proba-
ble cause warrant to conduct this procedure.3" Relying on Winston v.
Lee,393 the court ruled that in addition to establishing probable cause, the
Government would also have to show that its need for this evidence
outweighed any risk of harm to T.S.394
Although this court correctly concluded that the Government must
establish probable cause before it seeks to compel the extraction of blood
from a person,395 its dismissal of R. Enterprises and Henry is questionable
on at least three grounds.
First, FRCRP 17(c) authorizes the production of "books, papers,
documents or other objects."396  Presumably a blood sample could be
viewed as an "object." 39 7 Consequently, the demand for a production of
such a sample is probably within the scope of Rule 17(c). Second, the
court failed to explain why the demand for blood raises privacy concerns
different from those associated with a subpoena for any documents.
Certainly a grand jury subpoena for one's personal diary or intimate letters
also raises significant privacy interests. 9  Furthermore, Henry did not
391. Id.
392. Id. at 1205-06.
393. 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
394. In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. at 1206.
395. See also Commonwealth v. Downey, 553 N.E.2d 1303, 1306-07 (Mass. 1990)
(holding that because the grand jury already had probable cause to indict the defendant and
because he had a hearing at which he challenged the constitutionality of the blood sample
request, the order compelling him to provide a sample did not violate his Fourth Amendment
rights); Grand Jury v. Marquez, 604 N.E.2d 929, 936-37 (IUl. 1992) (holding that a grand jury
subpoena for body hair must be supported by probable cause before it will be enforced because
allowing such bodily intrusions on the basis of reasonable suspicion would violate the Illinois
Constitution). For a discussion of Grand Jury v. Marquez, see Hon. Michael J. Burke &
Kathryn E. Creswell, Constitutional Privacy Limitations on Grand Jury Subpoenas, 81 ILL.
B.J. 462, 463-67 (1993).
396. FED. R. CRiM. P. 17(c) (emphasis added).
397. David S. Rudolf & Thomas K. Maher, Behind Closed Doors, THE CHAMPION, June
1993, at 32; see also United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 713 n.7 (1980).
Wigmore has identified the testimonial duty as including an obligation 'to disclose
for the purpose of justice all that is in his control which can serve the ascertain-
ment of the truth, [and] this duty includes not only mental impressions preserved
in his brain and the documents preserved in his hands, but also the corporal facts
existing on his body.'
Id. (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2194 (1961)). In Euge, the Court held that the
power of the Internal Revenue Service to summons individuals to "appear" and to "produce
such books, papers, records or other data," included the power to compel handwriting exem-
plars from those summoned. I at 719.
398. Traditionally, the Fifth Amendment protected people from the compelled production
of private documents. Boyd v. United States 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886). In recent years,
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rely on the holding in Skinner to reach its conclusion that individualized
suspicion would suffice to find such a subpoena reasonable. The court in
Henry specifically rejected the "special needs" doctrine used in Skinner399
and merely cited Skinner for the principle that in certain cases where "a
showing of probable cause has not proved possible, the Court has turned to
a showing of individualized suspicion."" Because the court in Henry
had concluded that a finding of probable cause in the context of a grand
jury subpoena was "untenable,""1 it balanced the interests involved and
concluded that the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion should be used
to evaluate the reasonableness of such a subpoena.4° Consequently, the
court's rejection of Henry's ruling is based on flawed reasoning.
In a state case on this same issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals of
Oklahoma has also ruled that a showing of probable cause is required
before a grand jury may subpoena a person's blood.4 3  As in the two
previous cases, the Oklahoma court quickly determined that the extraction
of blood involves a search under the Fourth Amendment. 4' Although not
citing In re Grand Jury (TS.), this court also rejected Henry's holding that
reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause, is required to constitution-
ally validate these subpoenas.' 5 It found no reason to reduce one's
constitutional protections just because a grand jury, rather than a police
officer, seeks to invade a person's skin.4  The court recognized that if
it reduced such traditional constitutional protections, the Government could
however, the Supreme Court has held that if a document is created voluntarily, the recipient
may not claim the protection of the Fifth Amendment for the contents of the document because
the element of government compulsion is absent. E.g., United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605,
611-12 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,397, 409-10 (1976); see also In re Grand
Jury, 1 F.3d 87, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981, 983 (4th
Cir. 1991), affd after remand sub nom. United States v. Stone, 976 F.2d 909, 911 (4th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1843 (1993); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 83, 84 (D.C. Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990); In re Grand Jury, 759 F.2d 1418, 1419-20 (9th Cir.
1985). Consequently, subpoena recipients have turned to the Fourth Amendment for possible
protection of their privacy in personal documents. E.g., Senate Select Comm. on Ethics v.
Packwood, 845 F. Supp. 17, 18, 21 (D.D.C. 1994); In re Grand Jury (Arrington), 782 F. Supp.
1518, 1525 (N.D. Ala. 1992), dismissed as moot in part, affirmed in part, 955 F.2d 670 (11 th
Cir. 1992); see also Marano v. Holland, 366 S.E.2d 117, 127 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that a
production order for a defendant's personal documents violated the Fourth Amendment because
the order was not supported by probable cause).
399. Henry v. Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247, 254 n.6 (N.D. Il1. 1991).
400. Id.
401. Id. at 254.
402. Id.
403. Woolverton v. Grand Jury, 859 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).





abuse the grand jury system.4 7  For example, every time it was not
possible to establish probable cause to secure a search warrant for blood,
a prosecutor could simply circumvent the Fourth Amendment and seek the
evidence by way of a grand jury subpoena.4" This concern would not be
limited to a demand for blood samples, but would apply to any grand jury
demand for intrusive physical evidence. 9 Although the court realized that
the purpose of the grand jury is to determine whether there is probable
cause to indict an individual, it did not believe it would either burden the
grand jury or compromise its secrecy to require a showing of probable
cause before it invaded a person's body.
410
Notwithstanding that the courts disagree about what standard should
be used to evaluate the reasonableness of a subpoena for blood, they do
agree on one salient point-a subpoena that lacks a preliminary showing of
at least some individualized suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment.
E. The Court Should Require a Preliminary Showing of Probable Cause
to Support Subpoenas for Blood
Henry, In re Grand Jury (TS.), and Woolverton demonstrate the
conflict over what standard should be used to evaluate the constitutionality
of a subpoena for a blood sample. In view of Supreme Court precedent and
the nature of this particular type of invasion of privacy, the Supreme Court
should adopt the conclusions of the courts in In re Grand Jury (TS.) and
Woolverton and require the Government to establish probable cause before
permitting it to demand a sample of a person's blood.4 '
The Fourth Amendment demands that the Government establish
probable cause before it invades one's body. The Court made it clear in
Schmerber that the Government must have probable cause to invade an
arrestee's body to obtain a sample of blood for investigation of a criminal
offense.412 It dispensed with the warrant requirement only because of the
407. Id.
408. Id-
409. Id. See also, Grand Jury v. Marquez, 604 N.E.2d 929, 939 (11. 1992) (ruling that a
grand jury subpoena for head and pubic hair must also be supported by probable cause).
410. Woolverton, 859 P.2d at 1115-16. The court offered no reasons for this conclusion
but merely stated:
While we recognize that a grand jury's purpose is to establish probable cause, we
do not believe it will be too burdensome to require probable cause for a grand jury
subpoena in these cases. In addition, a probable cause determination can be
judicially made without unduly burdening a grand jury's investigation or violating
grand jury secrecy.
Id.
411. See also Renskers, supra note 247, at 323-24.
412. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
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exigencies in that case.4 13 Those exigencies do not exist with a subpoena
for DNA testing of blood.
Unlike the blood extraction in Schmerber, the grand jury demand for
invasion of the body is not made incident to a valid arrest. To the contrary,
the Government seeks to conduct this bodily intrusion in order to gather
evidence to culminate in a valid arrest. The function of the grand jury is
to investigate a crime, focus on a suspect, and charge the accused.414 In
most instances, the arrest follows the demand for evidence, the establish-
ment of probable cause for the charge, and the indictment of the individ-
ual.415
Additionally, when the Government seeks to invade the body in order
to extract blood for DNA analysis, there are no exigent circumstances.
Unlike alcohol in the bloodstream, which dissipates over time, DNA does
not change.416 Therefore, there is no danger that recipients of a subpoena
for blood can change or destroy their DNA composition.41
7
Irrespective of the fact that a blood test is commonplace and does not
involve a serious risk4 " if conducted in a safe environment by a compe-
tent individual, Schmerber stressed that in the context of a criminal
investigation, the test must be preceded by a warrant based on probable
cause. If exigent circumstances are present, then the warrant requirement
may be abandoned, but probable cause still must exist.
419
When searching for blood, it should be irrelevant whether a criminal
investigation is initiated by the grand jury or by law enforcement agencies.
The goals of these institutions are the same: investigating criminal matters
and amassing evidence through the invasion of the body.420 While it is
true that since the decision in Hale v. Henkel, the Court has treated a grand
jury subpoena differently than it has a police search, the following reasons
demonstrate that this distinction is inappropriate with respect to a subpoena
for blood. First, unlike a search warrant where the police inspect a person's
personal belongings for seizure of specific items, a subpoena for physical
evidence permits recipients to sift through their own belongings to satisfy
the demand.421 Thus, there is a diminished infringement on privacy.
413. Id. at 771 (finding that the delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatened the loss
of evidence).
414. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
415. See generally 1 BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 17, § 6:40, at 232-42 (discussing the
reasons to have sealed indictments and the possible effect on due process).
416. See supra note 258 and accompanying text; see also, Burk, supra note 258, at 470.
417. See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
418. See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text.
419. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966).
420. See supra notes 354 & 406 and accompanying text.
421. See supra notes 128 & 139 and accompanying text.
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This, however, is not the case with a subpoena for a sample of blood. Such
a subpoena authorizes the Government to enter a person's body to extract
the possible evidence, rather than allowing the recipient to merely provide
a self-obtained DNA analysis. This procedure implicates "the personal and
deep-rooted expectations of privacy" 42 that the Constitution firmly
protects by requiring a preliminary showing of probable cause.
The information that is disclosed through blood analysis is highly
confidential.' 5 In addition to revealing DNA composition, blood testing
may disclose genetic disorders, predisposition to medical conditions, or the
presence of certain antibodies in the blood.42 Such information is highly
personal, possibly traumatizing, 5 and potentially stigmatizing.
426
The Court has recognized that unlike the target of a search warrant, a
recipient of a subpoena has notice of the search427 and, therefore, may
move to quash it before it is enforced.428 This right is a hollow one,
however, if the Government need not establish probable cause before the
court enforces a subpoena. It still allows the Government to invade a
person's privacy without a preliminary showing of facts justifying this
action.
A motion to quash is of minimal value to a subpoena recipient because
there are only limited challenges to a subpoena duces tecum. Currently, in
order to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, a subpoena must not
be overbroad.429 A recipient of a subpoena for one blood sample could
422. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985).
423. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989); Cavoli,
supra note 213, at 1401.
424. See supra text accompanying note 266; Emily Yoffe, Is Kary Mullis God? (Or Just
the Big Kuhuna?), ESQUIRE MAG., July 1994, at 70.
425. But see Cavoli, supra note 213, at 1401-02 (suggesting that such concerns are
misplaced because the forensic use of DNA differs significantly from its medical application).
426. Hoeffel, supra note 198, at 531-33; see also supra text accompanying note 266.
427. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
428. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
429. E.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76-77 (1906) (stating that the Fourth Amendment
limits a subpoena for "contracts and documents" to relevant documents); Oklahoma Press
Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
guards against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in that the items
requested must be "particularly described"); United States v. Susskind, 965 F.2d 80, 86 (6th
Cir. 1992), rehearing en banc, 4 F.3d 1400 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that the defendant has the
burden of showing the subpoena was "unreasonably sweeping" in its coverage); United States
v. Anderson, 906 F.2d 1485, 1496 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming the standard that a grand jury
subpoena is not unreasonable if it orders production of material relevant to the investigation,
specifies the items with reasonable particularity, and spans a reasonable time period); In re
Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. deniea4 414 U.S. 867 (1973) (holding the a
subpoena for the contents of three file cabinets sufficiently particular to survive a Fourth
Amendment challenge); People v. DeLaire, 610 N.E.2d 1277, 1283 (I11. App. Ct. 1993)
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not challenge it on the grounds of overbreadth because a single demand for
one sample of blood can not possibly be viewed as overbroad.
A recipient of a grand jury subpoena may challenge the demand under
FRCRP 17(c). Pursuant to that rule, a motion to quash a subpoena may be
granted if it is found to be "unreasonable or oppressive. 430 If a challeng-
er argues that the subpoena is unreasonable on the grounds of relevancy, the
Court has ruled that he must show that the materials sought by the
Government will not produce information relevant to the investigation.43'
When a recipient attacks a grand jury subpoena for blood on Fourth
Amendment grounds, he is not addressing the question of whether the
requested evidence is relevant432 to the investigation. Instead, he is
contending that, even if the evidence may be relevant, the Government has
not shown sufficient facts to permit this intrusion on his reasonable
expectation of privacy, 33 that is, the Government has failed to establish
a fair probability, not a mere possibility, that the material sought is
evidence of a crime and that it will be found on him.434  If the Court
allowed subpoenas for invasions of privacy merely on the basis of relevancy
and not probable cause, then any time substances containing DNA were
found at a crime scene and a victim alleged that the perpetrator was a
member of a certain race, the Government could subpoena individuals of
that race who lived in the area and demand that they all present themselves
for the extraction and testing of their blood.435  The evidence of their
DNA composition might be relevant to the investigation, but such
Government action certainly would not be permissible under the Fourth
Amendment.4 6  Thus, a FRCRP 17(c) challenge based on relevancy is
(determining that acquisition of message unit detail records is constitutional if relevant and not
excessive).
430. FED. R. CRim. P. 17(c).
431. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991).
432. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID.
401 (emphasis added).
433. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) ("The interests in human
dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions [into the
body to extract blood] on the mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.").
434. In order to establish probable cause, the Government must set forth facts that would
lead a neutral magistrate to believe that a particular person has evidence that is relevant to the
specific crime under investigation. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983); see also
Davis v. Texas, 831 S.W.2d 426, 440 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
435. Grand Jury v. Marquez, 604 N.E.2d 929, 935 (Il. 1992).
436. Id. See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969) (finding that the seizure
of 24 black men, including Davis, for fingerprinting, based on one lead that the offender was
black, was unconstitutional because the seizure was not supported by probable cause); Renske-
rs, supra note 247, at 328-30 (arguing that the Fourth Amendment protects against mass
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inapposite. A motion to quash such a subpoena is of little value, unless it
is recognized that the Fourth Amendment requires that a subpoena must be
supported by probable cause before it can be enforced.
If a showing of probable cause is not required, the Government will
be allowed to circumvent the Fourth Amendment. If the Government may
effect this invasion of the recipient's body without establishing probable
cause, the Government may realize through a subpoena what it cannot
constitutionally accomplish in any other criminal investigation-the
invasion of the body for physical evidence of a crime without any
preliminary showing of probable cause.437 Without such a showing, the
grand jury may choose to target a person and seek a blood sample on the
"mere chance" that the search will yield evidence of a crime."3 ' The
Supreme Court has firmly rejected this practice.439
Additionally, a subpoena for a blood sample is sui generis. Such a
subpoena cannot be compared with a subpoena for other objects. In the
case of objects, a person may not entertain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in an object routinely exposed to others.440 Consequently, when
the government demands such objects, no "search" has taken place."1
This is not the case with blood. People do not regularly expose their blood
or its composition to others. Consequently, a subpoena that demands such
an invasion of privacy is a search which requires a preliminary showing of
probable cause.
Furthermore, this type of subpoena, unlike a subpoena for objects, is
entitled to significant Fourth Amendment protection because it implicates
heightened privacy concerns." 2  Reasonable suspicion is insufficient
because this standard is reserved for those instances where the Government
intrusion is slight. 3 When the Government seeks to stick a needle in a
person's arm to extract a substance from which it can ascertain highly
personal and confidential information,"" the intrusion is not slight." 5
Such government conduct must be supported by probable cause in order to
be constitutionally permissible."6
"round ups" by requiring some degree of individualized suspicion).
437. See supra notes 407-08 and accompanying text.
438. In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. 1196, 1205 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
439. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 747, 769-70 (1966).
440. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
441. Id.
442. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 767.
443. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
444. See supra text accompanying notes 241-44.
445. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769; In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. 1196, 1205 (W.D.
Ky. 1993).
446. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770; In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. at 1205-06. But
see, Cavoli, supra note 213, at 1405 (arguing that "reasonable suspicion," rather than probable
1995]
AM. J. CRIM. L.
The Court has stressed that in most cases, it will not require the grand
jury to show probable cause to issue a subpoena for physical evidence
because the grand jury is merely an investigatory body."7 Its mission is
to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that a crime has been
committed and that a certain person has committed it.448 To reach these
conclusions, it is to examine every conceivable piece of evidence.
4
Because of this investigatory role, it may be argued, as the court did in
Henry, that requiring the grand jury to initially establish probable cause to
subpoena a person's blood is both illogical and impractical.450 It may be
viewed as illogical because the ultimate task of the grand jury is to
determine whether there is probable cause to believe a crime has been
committed and whether a particular person should be charged.451 Conse-
quently, requiring the prosecutor or grand jury foreperson to establish
probable cause before the enforcement of such a subpoena would be
illogical-it would compel a showing of probable cause before the grand
jury had fully investigated the case and established probable cause.452
However, as the court found in In re Grand Jury (TS.), the probable
cause needed to obtain a search warrant differs from that which is required
for indicting a person.45 3 In order to secure a search warrant, the Govern-
ment must establish by a totality of the circumstances that there is a fair
probability that the evidence sought will be found in the place or on the
person to be searched.4" In contrast, the probable cause needed to charge
a suspect requires that there be a fair probability that a crime has been
committed and that a certain person has committed it.
415
These two standards differ substantially. The first concentrates on
facts leading to the conclusion that evidence or instrumentalities of a crime
will be found in a certain location or on a certain person. The other
concentrates on facts leading to the conclusion that a crime has been
committed and a certain suspect has committed it. Just because evidence
of a crime may be found on a certain person does not mean that person
should be charged with a crime.451 The person may have a justification
cause, is sufficient to support a court order for a blood sample).
447. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991).
448. Id.
449. Id.
450. Henry v. Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247, 259 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
451. Id.
452. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919); see also R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S.
at 297.
453. In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
454. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)).
455. Id. at 1201 (citing United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991)).
456. See, e.g., Jim Newton, SIMPSON CASE HEIGHTENS STAKES IN "DNA WAR," L.A.
TIMEs, Aug. 7, 1994, at A29.
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or defense for any or all alleged actions or may be merely a witness to the
crime who has not yet come forward. A search of the person may or may
not lead the grand jury to its target. Therefore, requiring the Government
to establish probable cause before invading a person's body for evidence
would not necessarily duplicate the grand jury's task of determining
whether there was probable cause to indict.457 Despite the court's
declaration in Henry, it is not therefore "untenable" to require a preliminary
showing of probable cause before permitting the grand jury to invade a
person's body for corporeal evidence.4"8 The court's conclusion that the
lesser standard of reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause should
be adopted in this situation is based on a faulty premise and should not be
followed.
Additionally, requiring probable cause before permitting the Govern-
ment to invade the body for evidence may be considered impractical.4 9
Placing the prerequisite of probable cause on a subpoena demanding blood
from a person would impose a burden on the broad investigatory powers of
the grand jury.4"° It would certainly restrict the grand jury's power to
merely demand any evidence it might consider relevant or helpful. It may
delay the course of the investigation, which the Court has always been
reluctant to do.46'
But the Government regularly interrupts grand jury proceedings: to
secure a warrant to search for and seize certain items,4 62 to respond to
motions to quash by a subpoena recipient,4' and to request that a court
order a recalcitrant witness to testify!.4 4 These interruptions are accept-
able, however, because they are required by law. Here, the disruption
caused by requiring the Government to make a preliminary showing of
probable cause before conducting this search is also acceptable, because it
is required by the Fourth Amendment.
465
The Court has already held that the Fourth Amendment requires that
457. In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. at 1203.
458. Id. at 1203.
459. Burke & Creswell, supra note 395, at 467.
460. United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 298 (1991) ('The teaching of the
Court's decisions is clear. A grand jury 'may compel the production of evidence or the
testimony of witnesses as it considers appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained
by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials."')
(citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974)).
461. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
462. In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. at 1204.
463. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c); see also, id.; Henry v. Ryan, 775 F. Supp. 247, 249 (N.D.
Ill. 1991).
464. 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1988); FED. R. CRiM. P. 17(g).
465. In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. at 1205; Woolverton v. Grand Jury, 859 P.2d
1112, 1115 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
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probable cause must exist before the police extract a sample of blood from
an arrestee.466 Under the Court's own standards, there is no meaningful
difference when it is the prosecutor,4 67 rather than the police, who is
demanding a specimen of blood. For constitutional purposes, one
Government agent is the same as another Government agent.4 68 Further-
more, if the Government must establish probable cause to extract a blood
sample from an arrestee,469 a fortiori, it should be required to do so when
it seeks to extract blood from a mere suspect.
A preliminary showing of probable cause, however, would have an
effect on the three critical features of the grand jury-its independence, its
secrecy, and its expansive power-because it would require the Government
to justify its demand in writing and would authorize the Court to evaluate
this justification before serving the subpoena.47 But the Court has never
held that any of the grand jury's traditional features are without limits. 471
The grand jury's independence is already restricted by the fact that it is the
prosecutor who directs the investigations by deciding which matters to
466. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
467. See supra text accompanying notes 40-50.
468. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989).
Although the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search or seizure, even an
arbitrary one, effected by a private party on his own initiative, the Amendment
protects against such intrusions if the private party acted as an instrument or agent
of the Government.... A railroad that complies with the provisions of... the
regulations does so by compulsion of sovereign authority, and the lawfulness of
its acts is controlled by the Fourth Amendment.
kLd (citations omitted); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 634 (1986).
Sixth Amendment principles require that we impute the State's knowledge from
one state actor to another. For the Sixth Amendment concerns the confrontation
between the State and the individual. One set of state actors (the police) may not
claim ignorance of defendants' unequivocal request for counsel to another state
actor (the court).
Id. (footnotes omitted); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 467 (1981).
That respondent was questioned by a psychiatrist designated by the trial court to
conduct a neutral competency examination, rather than by a police officer,
government informant, or prosecuting attorney, is immaterial [for Miranda
purposes]. When Dr. Grigson went beyond simply reporting to the court on the
issue of competence and testified for the prosecution at the penalty phase on the
crucial issue of respondent's future dangerousness, his role changed and became
essentially like that of an agent of the State.
Il; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) ("The prosecutor's office is an entity
and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. A promise made by one attorney must
be attributed, for these purposes, [due process] to the Government .... ") (citations omitted).
469. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
470. See infra note 493 and accompanying text.
471. See supra text 92-98 and accompanying text.
378 [Vol 22:327
1995] Vampires Among Us
explore and what evidence to present. Additionally, the secrecy
provisions of the grand jury are not absolute 73 In the face of "compel-
ling necessity,"'474 the Court may disclose confidential matters occurring
before the grand jury.475 Furthermore, constitutional provisions476 limit
the power of the grand jury. It is the Fourth Amendment that requires the
Government to establish probable cause before it seeks to extract a blood
sample from a subpoena recipient.' Although such a requirement affects
the independence, secrecy, and power of the grand jury, it is a requirement
mandated by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.
F Applying a Showing of Probable Cause to a Grand Jury Subpoena for
Blood
If a probable cause standard was applied to a current grand jury
subpoena for blood, the subpoena would fail to meet that standard. This
subpoena, unlike a warrant, is not issued by a judge 78 It is issued by a
clerk of the court.479 No one is required to establish probable cause or
even individualized suspicion to obtain such a subpoena.480 The prosecu-
tor merely requests a blank subpoena from the clerk and then fills in the
request for physical evidence. 4 1 No additional supporting information is
required before it is either served or is enforced.482 In light of the
preceding analysis, such a subpoena violates the Fourth Amendment.
V. Proposal for Change
The law and its many facets is not an empty bottle. Rather, it is one,
which like good wine, is nurtured in the vintage of experience. Recent
experience has required more aggressive prosecution of society's fight
against the mounting evils of crime. We commend both vigorous
prosecution and all legitimate means in aid of this laudable task. This,
472. See supra text accompanying notes 40-50.
473. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
474. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
475. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
476. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
477. In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. 1196, 1202-1203 (W.D. Ky. 1993);
Woolverton v. Grand Jury, 859 P.2d 1112, 1115 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
478. FED. R. Cium. P. 17(a).
479. Id.
480. lId; United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991).
481. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a).
482. Id.; R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. at 297-98.
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however, does not mean that society can afford a "no holds barred"
approach to law enforcement lest the "solution" engender faults of an
equally serious nature.
483
A grand jury subpoena for blood constitutes a search.8 4 This search
must be preceded by a finding of probable cause.85 The Court, therefore,
has two options. The first option would require that grand juries secure a
search warrant each time they sought such evidence. 486  The second
option, would require the Government to establish probable cause before the
service of such a subpoena.4 7
The first option has the benefit of being familiar to those in the
criminal justice field. Just as with any other search warrant, the Govern-
ment would have to approach a neutral magistrate and present a sworn
affidavit setting forth probable cause for the search. 488  Because the
warrant is demanding an invasion into the body, before issuing the warrant,
the magistrate must find probable cause for the search489 and must also
conclude that the need for this evidence outweighs any risk of harm to the
individual.41 If the court decides to issue such a warrant, the Govern-
ment will be authorized to conduct the search during daytime hours, within
a designated period49 of time.
The second option has the strength of lower court support. It would
require the Government to make a preliminary showing4" of probable
483. United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 658, vacated, opinion withdrawn, 832 F.2d
664 (1st Cir. 1987) (en bane).
484. See supra notes 350, 354 & 404 and accompanying text.
485. See supra notes 354 & 403 and accompanying text.
486. In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. 1196, 1205-06 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
487. See infra notes 507-12 and accompanying text.
488. FED. R. CPi,. P. 41(c)(1).
489. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966).
490. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985).
491. FED. R. CRIm. P. 41(c)(1).
492. See, e.g., Grand Jury v. Marquez, 604 N.E.2d 929, 939 (Ill. 1992) (holding that the
prosecutor must establish probable cause before a subpoena for body hair samples will be
enforced). The court also held that a prosecutor must show relevance and individualized
suspicion before a subpoena for fingerprints, palm prints and an appearance in a lineup will
be enforced. Id.; see also In re Rende, 633 N.E.2d 746, 749-50 (I1. App. Ct. 1993) (ruling
that the State's Attorney must make either a sworn statement or present an affidavit to the
court establishing "individualized suspicion and relevance" before the court will enforce a
grand jury subpoena demanding that an individual appear in a lineup); see also Common-
wealth v. Doe, 563 N.E.2d 1349, 1352-53 (Mass. 1990) (holding that an order requiring a
suspect to participate in a pretrial lineup must be supported by "reasonable suspicion"); In re
Armed Robbery, 659 P.2d 1092, 1095-96 (Wash. 1983) (holding that requiring a target to
appear in a pretrial lineup was a Fourth Amendment seizure that must be supported by
probable cause); In re Kelley, 433 A.2d 704, 707 (D.C. 1981) (requiring a prosecutor who
wanted a target to participate in a lineup to first show a basis for the lineup that was consistent
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cause before the service of such a subpoena.493 There is precedent for
requiring the Government to make some type of preliminary showing for
a subpoena. In In re Grand Jury (Schofield),494 the Third Circuit held
that before it would enforce a subpoena duces tecum, the Government had
to show by way of affidavit that the information sought is relevant to and
needed for an investigation being conducted by the grand jury.495
Relying on Schofield, the Fourth Circuit held in In re Special Grand
Jury (Harvey)496 that when an attorney subpoenaed by a grand jury has
an ongoing attorney-client relationship with a grand jury target, the Govern-
ment must make a preliminary showing of relevance and need before the
court can enforce the subpoena demanding an attorney testify about a
client.497 The First Circuit has affrmed498 the adoption of a local
with the grand jury's legitimate function).
493. See, e.g., Woolverton v. Grand Jury, 859 P.2d 1112, 1116 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993)
(ruling that a grand jury subpoena demanding a person's blood must be preceded by a showing
of probable cause). The court declared that "[i]n order for this determination to be made, the
foreman of the grand jury should present an affidavit to the presiding judge. The affidavit
should contain facts necessary for a probable cause determination. To preserve the secrecy of
the grand jury proceedings, the affidavit shall be kept under seal." Id.
494. In re Grand Jury (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973), later appeal, 507 F.2d
963 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975).
495. Id. Other circuits, however, have refused to follow the Third Circuit. See, e.g., In re
Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe), 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1108 (1986) (finding that the Government is not required to make a preliminary showing of
need); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Battle), 748 F.2d 327, 330 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
Government is not required to make a preliminary showing of relevancy); United States v.
Santucci, 674 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1109 (1983) (allowing the
Government to fill out grand jury subpoenas demanding identification material without actual
prior grand jury authorization); In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701 (lst Cir. 1980) ('The practical
responsibility for controlling grand jury excesses lies with the district court ...."); United
States v. Wilson, 614 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that supervisory control of grand jury
procedures is narrowly construed in the Ninth Circuit). Additionally, this decision is called into
question by United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., which held that a grand jury subpoena is
presumed to be valid, and that no preliminary showing of relevance, admissibility or specificity
need be made by the Government before such a subpoena is enforced. United States v. R.
Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991). If the movant can show that there is no reasonable
possibility that the subpoena will produce information relevant to the grand jury investigation,
the court may modify or quash the subpoena.
496. 676 F.2d 1005, 1012 (4th Cir. 1982), vacated and withdrawn, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir.
1982). This case was rendered moot when the target of the investigation fled the jurisdiction.
497. Most courts, however, have declined to adopt such a requirement for attorney
subpoenas. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury (Anderson), 906 F.2d 1485, 1495-96 (10th Cir. 1990)
(holding that the Government needed to show no more than the recipients had sufficient notice
and that the material sought was relevant); United States v. Perry, 857 F.2d 1346, 1347, 1350,
1351 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the potential risks were insufficient to warrant a preliminary
showing of need or relevance prior to enforcement of the subpoena); In re Klein, 776 F.2d
628, 634 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the grand jury may call an attorney as a witness and
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rule499 that makes it a violation of professional conduct for a prosecutor
to serve such a subpoena upon an attorney without obtaining prior judicial
approval."re Several states, including Pennsylvania," Rhode Island,"2
request documents without making any preliminary showing of need). For a thorough
discussion of the problems associated with attorney subpoenas, see Robert B. Ellis, Note,
Attorney Subpoenas: The Dilemma Over A Preliminary Showing Requirement, 1991 U. ILL.
L. REV. 137, 168-70 (1991); Max D. Stem & David Hoffnan, Privileged Informers: The
Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposal For Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783 (1988);
Robert N. Weiner, Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas to Attorneys: A Proposal For Reform, 23
AM. CRlM. L. REv. 95 (1985); Seymour Glanzer & Paul R. Taskier, Attorneys Before the
Grand Jury: Assertion of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Protect a Client's Identity, 75 J.
CRwM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1070 (1984).
498. United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir. 1987), vacated, opinion withdrawn,
832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc).
499. MASS. S.J.C.R. 3:08, also known as Prosecutorial Function 15 (PF 15) states: "It
is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to subpoena an attorney to a grand jury without
prior judicial approval in circumstances where the prosecutor seeks to compel the attor-
ney/witness to provide evidence concerning a person who is represented by the attor-
ney/witness." (emphasis added). On June 27,1986, the United States District Court for
Massachusetts amended its Local Rules to add PF 15, which became effective on July 1, 1986.
lId
500. U.S.D. Cr. FOR THE DIST. OF MASS., LOCAL R. 5(d) (4) (B).
501. PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 3.10.
A public prosecutor or other governmental lawyer shall not, without prior judicial
approval, subpoena an attorney to appear before a grand jury or other tribunal
investigating criminal activity in circumstances where the prosecutor or other
governmental lawyer seeks to compel the attomey/witness to provide evidence
concerning a person who is or has been represented by the attorney/witness.
Id.
This rule was adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on November 7, 1988 and
became effective on November 26, 1988. In Baylson v. Disciplinary BcL of Pa., 975 F.2d 102,
104 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1578 (1993), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
held that this rule may not be applied to federal prosecutors because "its adoption as federal
law falls outside the rule-making authority of the district courts, and its enforcement as state
law violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution." Baylson, 975 F.2d at
104. The Third Circuit made it clear, however, that nothing about "the historic powers and
functions of the grand jury alone would prevent the adoption of a federal rule requiring
government prosecutors to obtain judicial approval before serving a grand jury subpoena on
an attorney." Id. at 112. For a critique of this rule, see Andrea F. McKenna, A Prosecutor's
Reconsideration of Rule 3.10, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 489 (1992).
502. R.I. Sup. Cr. R. 47, R.P.C. 3.8(o ("The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: ... not,
without prior judicial approval, subpoena a lawyer for the purpose of compelling the lawyer
to provide evidence concerning a person who is or was represented by the lawyer when such
evidence was obtained as a result of the attorney-client relationship.").
This rule became effective on November 15, 1988. In re Almond, 603 A.2d 1087, 1088
(R.I. 1992). On April 20, 1989, the United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island ordered the incorporation of this rule into the local rules of the District Court. Id. In
a recent decision, however, the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire
followed the decision in Baylson and declared that the federal court's adoption of this local
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Tennessee,503 and Virginia5 4 have also formulated rules requiring prose-
cutors to obtain judicial approval before serving subpoenas on attorneys for
evidence about their clients.
In order to require a preliminary showing of probable cause for a grand
jury subpoena for blood, the Supreme Court 5 must amend FRCRP 17(c)
to add the following provisions:5°6
FOR EXTRACTION OF BLOOD: A subpoena may also
command the person to whom it is directed to submit to an
extraction and testing of a blood sample. These procedures must
be conducted in a safe, medical environment by a trained
technician."°
rule was invalid because it exceeds the court's rulemaking power and violates the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution. Almond v. United States Dist. Ct. Dist. of R.I., 852
F. Supp. 78, 79 (D.N.H. 1994).
503. TENN. Cr. C.P.R. 8 D.R. 7-103(C).
It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to subpoena an attorney to the grand
jury or to any state of federal administrative body with a similar function without
prior judicial approval in circumstances where the prosecutor or such other
government attorney seeks to compel the attorney-witness to provide evidence
concerning a person who at the time is represented by the attorney-witness.
Id.
504. VA. Sup. Cr. R. 3A: 12 (a).
No subpoena or subpoena duces tecum shall be issued in any criminal case or
proceeding, including any proceeding before any grand jury, which subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum is (i) directed to a member of the bar of this Com-
monwealth or any other jurisdiction, and (ii) compels production or testimony
concerning any present or former client of the member of the bar, unless the sub-
poena request has been approved in all specifics, in advance, by a judge of the
circuit court wherein the subpoena is requested after reasonable notice to the
attorney who is the subject of the proposed subpoena. The proceedings for
approval may be conducted in camera, in the judge's discretion, and the judge
may seal such proceedings. Such subpoena request shall be made by the Common-
wealth's attorney for the jurisdiction involved, either on motion of the Common-
wealth's attorney or upon request to the Commonwealth's attorney by the foreman
of any grand jury.
Id. (emphasis added).
505. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988) authorizes the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of
practice and procedure for the federal courts.
506. This proposed amendment is based largely on the ABA February 1986 Resolution
on Subpoenaing Attorneys Before the Grand Jury, reprinted in Stem & Hoffman, supra note
497, at 1852.
507. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771-72 (1966); see also, People v. Ford, 4.
Cal. App. 4th 32, 37-38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that the extraction of blood by a
technologist at a jail, rather than by a physician at a hospital, did not violate the Fourth
Amendment).
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The prosecutor shall not subpoena a blood sample from an
individual nor cause such a subpoena to be issued without prior
judicial approval."'
Prior judicial approval shall be withheld unless the court, in an ex
parte hearing, finds through sworn testimony or an affidavit
that:
a. a fair probability exists to believe that the substance
sought is evidence of a crime; and
b. a fair probability exists to believe that the substance will
be found on the particular person to be searched;10
and
c. the need for this evidence outweighs any risk of harm
to the individual.51
The hearing shall be conducted by the judge supervising the grand
jury in question. The ex parte hearing seeking judicial approval
shall be conducted with consideration for the need for the secrecy
of grand jury proceedings. After the hearing, the court may order
the sealing of the affidavit in support of the subpoena.
12
The proposed subpoena for extraction of blood would operate as
follows: When the Government seeks to obtain a sample of blood from an
individual, it would be required to approach the supervising judge of the
grand jury to apply for such a subpoena. At this stage, the Government
would be required to establish probable cause 13 through sworn testimony
or an affidavit,514 presented in an ex parte,"51 in camera proceeding
1 6
508. See, e.g., United States v. Ingram, 797 F. Supp. 705, 717 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (ruling
that a showing of reasonable suspicion must be made to a neutral judge before a hair sample
may be taken from a defendant released on bail). The court also stated that, "The requirement
of prior judicial approval will best safeguard the individual's privacy interests without placing
a significant burden on prosecutors or the court system." Id
509. United States v. Davenport, No. 89-5461, 1990 WL 116742, at *6 (4th Cir. July 26,
1990).
510. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
511. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985).
512. FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(e).
513. See, e.g., Davis v. Texas, 831 S. W. 2d 426, 440 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992)
514. See United States v. Davenport, No. 89-5461, 1990 W. 116742, at *6 (4th Cir. July
26, 1990) (stating that "a warrant or court order for a blood test must be supported by a sworn
affidavit or oath to be valid").
515. See supra notes 492-99 and accompanying text.
516. In United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme Court indicated that in response
to a recipient's Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c) Motion To Quash a Subpoena on the grounds that it
was unreasonable, the Government initially may disclose the subject matter of the investigation
to the court in camera. The Court stated that this would serve to protect the "strong
governmental interests in maintaining secrecy, preserving investigatory flexibility, and avoiding
384 [Vol 22:327
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Recipients wishing to comply with the subpoena would present
themselves to the grand jury for testing by a medical professional. If a
recipient wishes to challenge the subpoena, he can file a Motion to Quash
pursuant to FRCRP 17(c) arguing that under the Reasonableness Clause of
the Fourth Amendment5 7 or the Due Process Clause 18 of the Fifth
Amendment, 19 disclosure of the ex parte affidavit and an evidentiary
procedural delays." United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 302 (1991).
517. In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not require the
"full panoply of adversary safeguards [of] counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and
compulsory process for witnesses" for the judicial determination of probable cause to detain
a person arrested without a warrant.
These adversary safeguards are not essential for the probable cause determination
required by the Fourth Amendment. The sole issue is whether there is probable
cause for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings. This issue can
be determined reliably without an adversary hearing.. . That standard-probable
cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally has been decided
by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony,
and the Court has approved these informal modes of proof.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 120 (1975) (footnote omitted.)
The Court went on to explain that the Fourth, and not the Fifth, Amendment
determines the process that is due a defendant in a criminal case.
Here we deal with the complex procedures of a criminal case and a threshold right
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The historical basis of the probable cause
requirement is quite different from the relatively recent application of variable
procedural due process in debtor-credit disputes and termination of government-
created benefits. The Fourth Amendment was tailored explicitly for the criminal
justice system, and its balance between individual and public interests always has
been thought to define the 'process that is due' for seizures of person or property
in criminal cases, including the detention of suspects pending trial.... Moreover,
the Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is in fact only the first stage
of an elaborate system, unique in jurisprudence, designed to safeguard the rights
of those accused of criminal conduct.
Id. at 125 n.27; see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (holding that under
the Fourth Amendment, a defendant is entitled to challenge the veracity of the affidavit in
support of a search warrant).
In Stone v. Powell, the Court held that a defendant who has had a "full and fair litigation
of a Fourth Amendment claim," may not seek to address this constitutional issue again in a
federal habeas corpus petition. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). In order to ensure
such litigation, the Government must provide a "procedural mechanism" in which a defendant
can raise a Fourth Amendment claim and there must be a meaningful inquiry by the courts into
that claim. United States ex- rel. Bostick v. Peters, 3 F.3d 1023, 1027 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted).
518. In United States v. Real Property, the Court rejected the Government's argument that
because a seizure of property was based on a warrant supported by probable cause, the only
constitutional protection afforded the property owner in the forfeiture proceeding emanated
from the Fourth Amendment. Instead the Court found that both the Fourth and the Fifth
Amendments applied. United States v. Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 499-500 (1993).
519. Pursuant to Mathews v. Eldridge, the court would have to use a balancing test to
determine if disclosure of the exparte affidavit and an evidentiary hearing on the motion were
1995]
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hearing on the matter are necessary. This determination would be made by
the court on a case-by-case basis.s2
If the court denied the requests for disclosure and the hearing, it would
review the ex parte affidavit in camera and determine whether probable
cause existed in support of the subpoena.5 2' If the court granted the
recipient's requests for disclosure and a hearing, it would provide the
affidavit to the challenger and order a hearing. The movant could argue that
the subpoena was unreasonable because it was not supported by probable
cause5 and the risk of harm outweighed the need5" for the intrus-
ion.524 If the court found that the Government had not sustained its
required. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). The court would have to consider
the following facts:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Id. at 335.
520. Id. at 334 (."[D]ue process,' unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. [D]ue Process is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.") (citations omitted).
521. See, e.g., In re John Doe, 13 F.3d 633, 636-37 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that grand
jury targets were not denied due process by being refused access to Government affidavits and
by being refused an evidentiary hearing to determine the validity of the "crime-fraud
exception" to the attorney-client privilege); In re Grand Jury (Doe) No. 91-65139, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1247, at *13-14 (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 1993) (holding that an ex parte proceeding to
determine the validity of the "crime fraud" exception to the attorney-client privilege did not
violate due process); In re Grand Jury (Hill), 786 F.2d 3, 7-8 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that
there was no violation of the right to confrontation when the lower court considered an ex
parte affidavit in camera to decide a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena and a motion for
an evidentiary hearing); United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 1975)
(approving an in camera determination that the disclosure of a confidential informant's identity
would not enable the defendant to establish the existence of substantial falsehoods in a search
warrant affidavit); People v. Hobbs, 873 P.2d 1246, 1259 (Cal. 1994) ("[A]II or any part of
a search warrant affidavit may be sealed if necessary to implement the [informant's] privilege
and protect the identity of a confidential informant."). The court concluded that when a
defendant seeks to quash a warrant for which the supporting affidavit has been sealed, the
lower court should conduct an in camera hearing to determine whether there are sufficient
grounds to maintain the confidentiality of the informant's identity and whether the entire
affidavit or any portion of it should remain sealed. Id. at 1259-60.
522. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
523. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766 (1985).
524. The recipient of a grand jury subpoena should be permitted to challenge the alleged
probable cause supporting the subpoena at this stage because the court has always stressed that
unlike a search warrant, a subpoena permits the target to challenge its validity before it is en-
forced. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. Additionally, since the exclusionary rule
does not apply to grand jury proceedings, the target should be permitted to challenge the
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burden of establishing probable cause and proving that its need for the
evidence outweighed the potential risk of harm, then the court would quash
the subpoena. If it found that probable cause existed for such a search, the
court would enforce the subpoena and order the recipient to comply with
the request. Presumably, if the grand jury relies in good faith on this
finding by the court and the blood of the recipient is extracted and tested,
the recipient will not be able to later argue that no probable cause for the
search existed. 25
This proposed rule does impose some burdens on the Government. It
may consume some time and energy. It would require the Government to
set forth facts in an affidavit to persuade a judge that there was a "fair
probability that ... evidence of a crime"526 would be found on this
person.
This procedure may also briefly disrupt the efficient proceedings of the
grand jury.527 However, if the recipient does not choose to challenge the
subpoena, the expenditure of time and resources is minimal. If the recipient
does challenge the subpoena, FRCRP 17(c) already provides for a hearing
on the recipient's Motion to Quash the subpoena. 28 This proposed
amendment to the rule does not add any additional hearings to the
validity of the subpoena before the search is undertaken and the evidence is presented to the
grand jury. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
525. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); see also Davis v. Texas, 831 S.W.2d
426, 441 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that an affidavit in support of a warrant for blood, hair
and sperm samples was so "completely lacking in facts to support a finding of probable cause"
that "no reasonable, good-faith reliance by the officers was manifested").
526. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
527. In February 1988, the American Bar Association modified its 1986 resolution
regarding attorney subpoenas, by advocating that rather than an ex parte proceeding, this
hearing should be adversarial, with notice to the witness.
BE IT RESOLVED, That a prosecuting attorney shall not subpoena nor cause a
subpoena to be issued to an attorney without prior judicial approval after an
opportunity for an adversarial proceeding in circumstances where evidence
obtained as a result of the attorney-client relationship concerning a person who is
or was represented by the attorney; and BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That
prior judicial approval shall be withheld unless the court finds, on reasonable
notice to the attorney and the client ....
American Bar Association Resolution On Subpoenaing Attorneys Before The Grand Jury
(February 1988), reprinted in Stem & Hoffman, supra note 497, at 1853-54 (emphasis added).
The State of Virginia has adopted a similar rule. See supra note 504.
An adversarial hearing at the application stage would be too disruptive and would
potentially jeopardize the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. If the recipient does not wish
to challenge the subpoena, there is no need for such an adversarial hearing at the application
stage. Additionally, in order to preserve the efficiency and confidentially of the grand jury, the
decision on whether to hold an adversarial hearing as to whether the subpoena is supported by
probable cause should be made on a case-by-case basis.
528. FED. R. Cim. P. 17(c).
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process.529 Rather, it merely includes another potential fact for the
prosecutor to prove at the already-required hearing. Additionally, the
concerns about potential delay are not compelling because the question here
is not whether probable cause should be established at all, but whether it
should be demanded before the enforcement of the subpoena, rather than
before the application for a judicial warrant.
Additionally, there may be concerns that this proposal will compromise
the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings. The provision permitting the
prosecutor to present probable cause by way of a sworn affidavit through
an ex parte, in camera proceeding 3 . should alleviate these concerns.
Furthermore, allowing the affidavit to be sealed after the judge reviews it
should also allay fears about a breach of confidentiality.53" ' The court
need only reveal the contents of the ex parte affidavit in support of the
subpoena after it has balanced the interests of the parties and determined
that disclosure is required. To protect against any further disclosures, the
court may also decide to seal the transcript of the hearing on the motion to
quash. 5
32
On the other hand, this proposal offers significant benefits that
outweigh any of its potential detriments. First, if a showing of probable
cause for such a subpoena is not instituted, the grand jury will be prohibited
from obtaining such evidence unless the Government seeks and obtains a
search warrant for it.533 A search warrant is more procedurally complex
than a grand jury subpoena.5 34 Unlike a subpoena, a warrant is generally
valid for only a short period of time.535 Moreover, a warrant must usually
be served during daylight hours by a Government agent.536
A search warrant for a blood sample will require that the Government
find the person from whom it seeks to extract blood and seize him for
purposes of the testing. This may result in a dangerous confrontation
between the witness and the agent or may result in the use of unreasonable
force upon the witness.537 After the search is conducted, the Government
529. An adversarial hearing at the application stage is inappropriate. See supra note 527.
530. See supra text accompanying notes 515-16.
531. FED. R. CRim. P. 6(e)(6) ("SEALED RECORDS. Records, orders and subpoenas
relating to grand jury proceedings shall be kept under seal to the extent and for such time as
is necessary to prevent disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury.").
532. Id.
533. See also In re Grand Jury (T.S.), 816 F. Supp. 1196, 1198 (1993) (discussing
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)).
534. See FED. R. CRIm. P. 41(e); see also Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 546
(1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Obtaining a warrant is inconvenient and time consuming.").
535. FED. R. CraM. P. 41(e).
536. FED. R. CRTM. P. 41(c)(1).
537. See, e.g., Hammer v. Gross, 932 F. 2d 842 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 582 (1991) (finding that Hammer's civil rights were violated when, after he was
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must return the warrant along with a written inventory of the items
taken.538 The inventory must be made in the presence of the applicant for
the warrant and the person from whom the items were taken. 39 Thereaf-
ter, the magistrate must file the warrant and the inventory with the clerk of
the district court." Second, a preliminary showing of probable cause
may result in fewer challenges to the subpoenas. The recipient may realize
that the Government has already established probable cause before one
judge and that this finding will likely be affirmed by a second one.
The final and most important point is that by making a preliminary
showing of probable cause before serving this subpoena, the Government
will be adhering to the constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment and will be ensuring that the recipient is free from an unreasonable
search.
In short, this proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure does not compromise the independence, confidentiality, or power
of the grand jury proceedings.54" ' Instead, it serves to protect the constitu-
tional rights of those who are subpoenaed.542 In this way, it provides the
grand jury with a valuable alternative, while ensuring that the recipient's
Fourth Amendment rights are honored.
VI. Conclusion
Historically, the federal grand jury has exercised expansive power. It
has enjoyed tremendous independence and has maintained significant
secrecy around its proceedings.
One of its greatest powers has been the ability to subpoena witnesses
to provide oral testimony and physical evidence during a criminal
investigation. In recent years, it has used this power to subpoena blood
samples from individuals. The use of this power, however, must be limited
by Constitutional provisions. Invasions into the body constitute a search.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits such intrusions without a preliminary
showing of probable cause. Either this search must be preceded by a
traditional judicial warrant or a subpoena supported by probable cause.
In order to implement this principle, the Court should provide two
options. The Government may obtain a probable cause warrant to conduct
arrested for driving under the influence, police officers forcibly withdrew blood from him).
538. FED. R. CalM. P. 41(d).
539. Id.
540. FED. R. CRm. P. 41(g).
541. See supra text accompanying notes 471-76.
542. See supra note 477 and accompanying text.
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this search or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be amended
to provide that the Government must establish probable cause for the
intrusion before it serves such a subpoena. In this way, the Court would
preserve the power of the grand jury to obtain such evidence, but would
also guarantee that the recipient would be free from an unreasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment.
